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At the Intersection of Land Grievances and Legal 
Liability: The Need to Reconsider Contract Rights 
and Expectations at the Supranational Level 
 
Kaitlin Y. Cordes, Lise Johnson, and Sam Szoke-Burke* 
This Article explores how host governments’ legal obligations can 
affect or constrain their ability to address “land grievances,” which are 
defined as concerns raised by local individuals or communities in 
response to negative impacts of land-based investments. Obligations 
under international investment law, international human rights law, and 
investor-state contracts can be in tension or can directly conflict with 
one another, creating complexity for governments seeking to respond to 
land grievances. To explore the legal considerations that governments 
must navigate in this context, this Article considers several options that 
governments could pursue to respond to land grievances. In all of the 
options considered, the governmental action would also implicate 
investors’ contract rights or expectations, making the rights and 
obligations under investment treaties particularly important to 
consider. Given the challenges arising from these options, and in light 
of the critical need for governments to protect human rights and 
address their citizens’ concerns, the Article concludes with a call to 
reassess the elevation of contract rights and expectations to a 
supranational level via international investment law. In the absence of a 
more comprehensive overhaul of the investment law system, a more 
critical approach by arbitral tribunals regarding the nature and scope 
of contract rights (and expectations) deemed enforceable could help 
limit the potential for arbitral decisions to undermine governments’ 
abilities to address the concerns, and protect the rights, of their citizens. 
 
 
* Kaitlin Y. Cordes is Head of Land and Agriculture and Lead: Human Rights and Investment, 
Lise Johnson is Head of Investment Law and Policy, and Sam Szoke-Burke is a Legal Researcher 
at the Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment. This Article draws in part from research 
undertaken for a Center paper on a similar topic: Cordes, Johnson, and Szoke-Burke, “Land Deal 
Dilemmas: Grievances, Human Rights, and Investor Protections,” Columbia Center on 
Sustainable Investment (March 2016), http://ccsi.columbia.edu/2016/03/10/land-deal-dilemmas-
grievances-human-rights-and-investor-protections/. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Toward the end of 2015, the government of Ethiopia canceled a land 
lease contract held by an Indian investor.1 Under the contract, the 
investor—which boasts of undertaking agricultural production “on a 
mega scale”2—leased 100,000 hectares of land for an annual payment 
of slightly under USD $1/hectare.3 The Ethiopian government has 
 
1. William Davison, Karuturi Challenges Ethiopia Decision to Cancel Farm Project, 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESS (Jan. 11, 2016, 9:24 AM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-01-11/karuturi-challenges-ethiopian-decision-to-
cancel-farming-project; Birhanu Fikade, Karuturi Contemplates Legal Recourse for Loss in 
Ethiopia, THE REPORTER ETHIOPIA (Sept. 30, 2017), 
http://www.thereporterethiopia.com/business/karuturi-contemplates-legal-recourse-loss-ethiopia; 
Staff Reporter, Government Agency Strips Karuturi’s Land Privilege, CAPITAL ETHIOPIA (Jan. 
15, 2016), http://capitalethiopia.com/2016/01/15/government-agency-strips-karuturis-land-
privilege/. 
2. KARUTURI GLOBAL LIMITED, http://www.karuturi.com (last visited Jan. 21, 2018). 
3. Land Rent Contractual Agreement Made Between Ministry of Agric. & Rural Development 
and Karuturi Agro Prods. Plc., arts. 1.1, 2.2.1, 3.6, 5 (Oct. 25, 2010) [hereinafter Land Lease 
Agreement] (stating that the annual lease rate/hectare is 20 birr, which converts to slightly under 
USD $1. The lease also provided the right to receive an additional 200,000 hectares if 
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controversially welcomed a number of large-scale agricultural 
investments despite allegations of associated human rights violations.4 
The Ethiopian government reportedly asserted that the contract 
termination was due to the investor’s failure to sufficiently develop the 
land.5 The limited development had not, however, prevented negative 
impacts on local communities; researchers, for example, have alleged 
that the crops of indigenous people were cleared without consent in the 
investment area.6 In response to the government’s decision to cancel, 
the investor asserted that the government’s action constituted an 
expropriation in contravention of the bilateral investment treaty (“BIT”) 
between India and Ethiopia, and noted that it was prepared to seek 
arbitration.7 
Regardless of its outcome, this story may presage a new phase in the 
recent global land rush. As land-based investments for agriculture or 
forestry projects stall, fail, or face entrenched local opposition, the 
action or inaction of governments may be more likely to give rise to 
potential legal disputes, brought by investors as well as by project-
affected individuals or communities. At the same time, host 
governments are under growing pressure to ensure that land-based 
investments are responsible, as well as to better protect the tenure rights 
of land users generally.8 As this confluence of factors evolves, host 
 
development goals were met on the first concession area). 
4. See, e.g., David Smith, Ethiopians Talk of Violent Intimidation as Their Land is Earmarked 
for Foreign Investors, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 14, 2015, 7:14 AM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/14/ethiopia-villagisation-violence-land-grab 
(discussing the human impact of villagization, violent conflict, and investment). 
5. Amare Asrat, Agency Terminates Contract with Karuturi, FANA BROADCASTING 
CORPORATE (Dec. 31, 2015), http://www.fanabc.com/english/index.php/news/item/4810-agency-
terminates-contract-with-karuturi. 
6. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, “WAITING HERE FOR DEATH”: DISPLACEMENT AND 
“VILLAGIZATION” IN ETHIOPIA’S GAMBELLA REGION 56 (2012). 
7. Davison, supra note 1; Fikade, supra note 1; see also Investment Policy Hub: International 
Investment Agreements Navigator: Ethiopia, Bilateral Investment Treaties, UNCTAD, 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryBits/67 (last visited Jan. 21, 2018) (giving 
information on Ethiopia’s BITs). This may be an empty threat: the bilateral investment treaty 
between Ethiopia and India has been signed but may not be in force. See also Land Lease 
Agreement, supra note 3, at art. 17 (stating that the land lease agreement does not contain an 
arbitration clause, but rather states that disputes will “be referred to Ethiopian Federal Court”). 
8. This is partly in response to the perceived “global land rush” that followed the 2007–2008 
food price crisis, leading donors, UN technical agencies, civil society, and other stakeholders to 
have increasingly pushed for responsible land-based investments (or for no large-scale land-based 
investments at all, as argued by some civil society activists and others). This push led to, among 
other things, the Principles for the Responsible Investment in Agriculture and Food Systems, 
which are the product of high-level intergovernmental and multi-stakeholder negotiations at the 
Committee on World Food Security. COMMITTEE ON WORLD FOOD SECURITY, PRINCIPLES FOR 
RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT IN AGRICULTURE AND FOOD SYSTEMS (2014) [hereinafter WFS 
PRINCIPLES]. The pressure to ensure more responsible land-based investments has occurred 
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governments will more frequently confront the thorny question of how 
to deal with problems stemming from existing land-based investments 
in light of their legal obligations to different individuals, communities, 
and entities. 
This Article explores how governments’ legal obligations can affect 
or constrain the ability of host governments to address “land 
grievances,” which we define as concerns raised by local individuals or 
communities in response to the actual, perceived, or potential negative 
impacts of land-based investments. Legal obligations under 
international investment law, international human rights law, and 
investor-state contracts are particularly important. If human rights are in 
tension with investor protections, then one or more of the stakeholders 
risk bearing a significant burden (communities and individuals risk 
having their human rights violated), governments risk having to pay 
large awards (or high legal costs) under international investment law, 
and investors risk disruption to, or termination of, their business 
operations. In attempting to identify options to address grievances 
within the context of governments’ complex web of legal obligations, 
this Article also seeks to advance discussions on the perils of, and 
possible remedies for, the current fragmentation in international law. 
Part I provides an overview of land-based investments and the 
grievances they engender. Part II focuses on the obligations and redress 
mechanisms found in international investment law, international human 
rights law, and investor-state contracts, as well as some of the ways in 
which these obligations intersect and interact, and the challenges this 
can create for governments. Part III discusses three options that 
governments have to address land grievances—renegotiating investor-
state contracts, terminating contracts, and modifying the domestic legal 
framework—as a way to explore the accompanying legal considerations 
that governments must navigate, in particular when investors’ contract 
rights or expectations stand to be both affected by governmental action 
and elevated to a supranational level through interpretation of an 
investment treaty. Part IV concludes with a call to reassess whether, and 
if so which, contract rights or expectations should be elevated to a 
supranational level via international investment law. 
 
against the backdrop of a greater push at the international level to ensure better protection of 
tenure rights of all legitimate land users. This focus on tenure rights is best exemplified by the 
Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries, and Forests 
in the Context of National Food Security, also the result of high-level intergovernmental 
negotiations at the Committee on World Food Security. COMMITTEE ON WORLD FOOD 
SECURITY, VOLUNTARY GUIDELINES ON THE RESPONSIBLE GOVERNANCE OF TENURE OF LAND, 
FISHERIES AND FORESTS IN THE CONTEXT OF NATIONAL FOOD SECURITY (2012) [hereinafter 
WFS GUIDELINES]. 
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I.  LAND-BASED INVESTMENTS AND LAND GRIEVANCES 
A.  How Investments Occur and How They are Regulated 
A “global land rush” in the past two decades has been characterized 
by a marked increase in large-scale investments for agricultural, 
forestry, and other land-intensive projects, particularly in low- and 
middle-income countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.9 
Commercial motives, sometimes coupled with food security concerns, 
have been a main driver of investor interest;10 on the receiving end, 
countries have pursued such investment in the hopes that it will generate 
a range of coveted benefits including new capital, jobs, increased 
exports, and improved agricultural productivity.11 Although the scale of 
these land-based investments may not be as large as often described,12 
many land-based investments already implemented have had significant 
impacts on local communities. 
The process for investing in agriculture or forestry in any particular 
country is highly context-specific, depending on national, and 
sometimes sub-national, laws and policies.13 Yet, some general 
observations on how such investments occur and are regulated provide a 
basis for understanding the role of governments in facilitating, 
 
9. See, e.g., EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, ADDRESSING THE HUMAN RIGHTS IMPACTS OF ‘LAND 
GRABBING’ 8 (July 15, 2014) [hereinafter Impacts of ‘Land Grabbing’] (discussing the renewed 
interest in agricultural land); Rabah Arezki et al., What Drives the Global “Land Rush”?, 29 
WORLD BANK ECON. REV. 207, 207 (2013) (discussing “marked increases in the demand for 
agricultural land”); Kate Geary, “Our Land, Our Lives”: Time Out on the Global Land Rush, 
OXFAM INT’L 2 (Oct. 2012) (discussing the boom in food prices as triggering increased investor 
interest in land); Smita Narula, The Global Land Rush: Markets, Rights, and the Politics of Food, 
49 STAN. J. INT’L L. 101, 105–06 (2013) (discussing how “purchasing and leasing agricultural 
land in developing countries has skyrocketed”). 
10. Olivier De Schutter, The Green Rush: The Global Race for Farmland and the Rights of 
Land Users, 52 HARV. INT’L L.J. 503, 512–17 (2011); Narula, supra note 9, at 105–12. 
11. Narula, supra note 9, at 103; LORENZO COTULA ET AL., LAND GRAB OR DEVELOPMENT 
OPPORTUNITY? AGRICULTURAL INVESTMENT AND INTERNATIONAL LAND DEALS IN AFRICA 5, 
78–83 (2009) [hereinafter LAND DEALS IN AFRICA]; The Practice of Responsible Investment 
Principles in Larger-Scale Agricultural Investments: Implications for Corporate Performance 
and Impact on Local Communities, THE WORLD BANK REPORT NO. 86175-GLB (2014). 
12. See, e.g., Lorenzo Cotula et al., Testing Claims About Large Land Deals in Africa: 
Findings from a Multi-Country Study, 50 J. DEV. STUD. 903, 905 (2014) (finding that “land 
acquisition accounts for a small share of land suitable for agriculture in each country”). 
13. International and extraterritorial laws and policies can also influence and affect such 
investment. Given this Article’s primary focus on host governments seeking to address land 
grievances, this Section explores processes for investment within host countries, and sets aside 
the potential or actual influence of international laws or policies that might shape domestic laws 
and policies relevant to investment processes, although interactions between international and 
domestic law are considered in the following Section. This Section also does not consider the 
extraterritorial laws and policies that could influence how foreign investors undertake investments 
in certain scenarios. 
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participating in, and monitoring such investments, as well as the steps 
they may take to address related grievances. 
The land required for an investment may come from the government, 
a community, or private individuals.14 This Article focuses on contexts 
in which the government is involved either in transferring the land 
directly to an investor, or in otherwise facilitating the investment—for 
example, signing an investment incentive contract with a particular 
investor. Direct transfer of land by governments for purposes of 
agriculture or forestry investments has occurred most frequently in Sub-
Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia, where governments have entered 
into agreements with investors that allow the use of public, national, or 
state land (which may be technically owned by the government, even 
when others have legitimate tenure rights over the land in question).15 
In some places, laws may require private land to be transferred to the 
government before it can be leased to a foreign investor.16 
Investors may acquire land for agriculture or forestry through 
purchases (sales), leases, or concessions.17 A review of publicly 
 
14. The question of who has the right to allocate land to investors is highly specific, differing 
between and sometimes within countries. Even within specific contexts, the answers may be 
debatable: for example, a central government may claim legal authority to allocate land 
designated as state or public land, while land users whose families have used that same land for 
generations may dispute that authority—and may have backing for their position under 
international human rights law, or from soft law documents such as the Voluntary Guidelines on 
the Responsible Governance of Tenure. To generalize, however: in countries where land is owned 
or controlled primarily by the State, as in many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast 
Asia, the government generally allocates land to investors via long-term leases or concessions. 
Where land is controlled by customary authorities, it is generally those authorities who allocate 
land. When land is owned primarily by individuals, such as in much of Latin America, those 
individual landowners are generally the ones to allocate land to investors. See Impacts of ‘Land 
Grabbing’, supra note 9, at 14. 
15. This generalization does not hold true of all countries within the regions. In Ghana, for 
example, most land is not considered to be owned by the state, and customary chiefs frequently 
sign land leases for investment purposes. LAND DEALS IN AFRICA, supra note 11, at 78; 
COLUMBIA CTR. ON SUSTAINABLE INV., 2015–2016 ANNUAL REPORT (Oct. 7, 2015). 
16. In Tanzania, for example, village land or private land must be transferred to a national 
entity before a derivative right can be given to a foreign investor. Services to Investors, 
TANZANIA INVESTMENT CENTRE, http://tanzania.eregulations.org/menu/196?l=en (last visited 
Nov. 22, 2017). 
17. Land acquisition is not always needed for forestry projects. In some jurisdictions, 
investors in forestry projects can acquire licenses, permits, or “profits a prendre” that provide the 
investor with access to forest resources without actually transferring possession or control of the 
land itself. Governance Principles for Concessions and Contracts in Public Forests, FOOD & 
AGRIC. ORG. OF THE U.N., 45–54 (2001). Such licenses and permits generally provide access to 
resources on public land, but may also be used to help regulate forestry activities on private land, 
like the Private Use Permits that have been used in Liberia (which have been heavily criticized). 
See, e.g., An Act Adopting the National Forestry Reform Law of 2006, §§ 5.1–5.7 (Liber.) 
[hereinafter NFRL] (establishing Private Use Permits); GLOBAL WITNESS, SIGNING THEIR LIVES 
AWAY: LIBERIA’S PRIVATE USE PERMITS AND THE DESTRUCTION OF COMMUNITY-OWNED 
 
2017] Land Grievances and Legal Liability 521 
available investor-state contracts for agriculture and forestry projects 
shows that most contracts take the form of leases or concessions, rather 
than sales.18 While such land use transfers are thus time-bound, they can 
still cover a significant length of time, with many agreements spanning 
anywhere from twenty-five years to ninety-nine years.19 The length of 
these agreements may be governed by law or otherwise standardized 
within a country.20 This is not always static. For example, in Cambodia, 
Economic Land Concessions (“ELCs”) for industrial-scale agriculture 
have been limited to ninety-nine years, but the government has more 
recently moved to limit the duration of certain concessions to fifty years 
as part of a larger review of new and existing ELCs mandated in 2012.21 
Investor-state contracts differ in their complexity, as well as in their 
purported comprehensiveness. Some contracts are predicated on the 
receipt of additional permits or approvals, while others may endeavor to 
settle all relevant issues related to the underlying project, including by 
obligating the government to ensure that any requisite authorizations are 
provided as needed.22 
 
RAINFOREST (Sept. 2012) (also discussing Liberia’s Private Use Permits). 
18. At the time of writing, OpenLandContracts.org, a global repository of publicly available 
investor-state contracts for agriculture or forestry projects, showed 154 unique contracts from 
fourteen countries (Cambodia, Cameroon, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Ghana, 
Ivory Coast, Liberia, Madagascar, Mali, Peru, Sierra Leone, South Sudan, Sudan, and Timor-
Leste), and only one involved a sale. However, because investments in land for agriculture and 
forestry projects are relatively opaque as compared to other types of resource investments, it is 
impossible to draw definitive conclusions based on publicly available documents. 
19. See, e.g., Ministère de l’Environnement, Conservation de la Nature et Tourisme, Contrat 
de Concession Forestiere, Republique Democratique du Congo, art. 3 (Oct. 24, 2011) (term of 
twenty-five years); Land Rent Contractual Agreement Made Between Ministry of Agric. & Saudi 
Star Agric. Dev. Plc., art. 2.1 (2010) (term of fifty years); Agreement for Plantation of Sugar 
Cane, & Processing Factory of Sugar Cane Between The Ministry of Agric., Forestry & Fisheries 
and Koh Kong Sugar Indus. Co. Ltd., Cambodia, art. 2.1 (Aug. 2, 2006) (term of ninety years). 
20. In Liberia, for example, the National Forestry Reform Law of 2006 establishes different 
types of forestry concessions in Liberia, with the larger concessions requiring a term that 
“approximate[s] the length of a forest rotation on the land based on a sustainable yield of Timber 
products,” and the smaller concessions restricted to a term of no more than three years. NFRL, 
supra note 17, at § 5.3(b)(viii), § 5.4(b)(iii). A review of publicly available land contracts and 
other publicly available concession information shows consistency in contract durations within 
countries as well: for example, all of the publicly available Ethiopian land lease agreements 
provided to foreign investors are for twenty-five years. 
21. Social Land Concessions, OPEN DEVELOPMENT CAMBODIA (Aug. 4, 2015) 
http://www.opendevelopmentcambodia.net/briefing/economic-land-concessions-elcs/; 
Concessions, OPEN DEVELOPMENT CAMBODIA (Aug. 4, 2015) 
https://opendevelopmentcambodia.net/topics/concessions/#ref-. 
22. Without weighing in on the legality of this, the Establishment Convention by & Between 
The Republic of Cameroon and SG Sustainable Oils Cameroon PLC., which freezes the list of 
authorizations needed, notes that they shall be provided without payments, and states that the 
“[g]overnment undertakes to promptly provide to Investor, and to cause any Governmental 
Authority to provide to Investor all certificates, exemptions, waivers, consents, licenses, permits, 
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In general, receiving the rights to use land is often only one of many 
steps to be undertaken before a land-based investment can be 
implemented. Requirements established by law or articulated in the 
relevant investor-state contract may, for example, require the investor to 
conduct an environmental impact assessment or receive an investment 
license before commencing.23 While investment promotion agencies 
may seek to smooth the path for investors in acquiring any necessary 
authorizations, the extent to which they can do so in practice may be 
limited, as the processes for granting relevant authorizations are 
generally handled by different levels of government, or different 
departments or ministries, that must enforce their own mandates. 
Throughout the lifecycle of an investment, the government is 
responsible for monitoring and enforcing the investor’s commitments 
and obligations—both those arising under domestic law and those 
flowing from investor-state contracts. Even highly resourced 
governments struggle to adequately monitor and enforce all relevant 
regulations pertaining to investors and other corporate actors; this can 
be an even greater challenge for less-resourced governments.24 Such 
difficulties are exacerbated when governments allow an expansive use 
of investor-state contracts to develop—in essence, unique legal regimes 
for each investment. When issues such as tax payments, local hiring, 
and water usage are negotiated and regulated via individual contracts 
rather than under a comprehensive and broadly applicable legal 
framework, host governments must then find a way to monitor each 
investor against a set of unique requirements and obligations. In the 
context of land-based investment, governments—many of which 
already struggle to monitor and enforce regulations—may not have the 
resources or capacity to properly monitor the complex agreements into 
which they enter. 
 
easements, documents and other authorizations, to the extent any of the foregoing are or may be 
desirable or necessary.” Establishment Convention by & Between The Republic of Cameroon and 
SG Sustainable Oils Cameroon PLC., § 4.11(c) (Sept. 17, 2009) [hereinafter Sustainable Oils 
Cameroon]. 
23. See, e.g., Memorandum of Understanding Between The Gov’t of The Republic of Sierra 
Leone and Sierra Akker Agric. Co. Ltd., app’x, arts. 2, 6 (June 2013). Article 2 of the appendix 
notes that the company will be granted all required permits and authorizations so long as the 
company complies with all published legal requirements. Id. at art. 2. Article 6 of the appendix 
states that the environmental license will be granted, subject to requisite conditions, unless 
withheld for lawful reasons or unless the company’s environmental management plan and 
environmental and social assessment are not adequately implemented. Id. at art. 6. 
24. David Graham & Ngaire Woods, Making Corporate Self-Regulation Effective in 
Developing Countries, 34 WORLD DEV. 868, 868 (2006) (“No country boasts perfect 
regulation—indeed the recent corporate collapses of ENRON and WorldCom exposed significant 
gaps. However, yet more serious gaps exist in most developing countries where governments 
have far less capacity to regulate.”). 
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Governments are dynamic; therefore, laws and policies of general 
applicability that affect an investment may be enacted, modified, or 
terminated during an investment. These changes may create or modify 
other regulatory requirements imposed on the investor. Investors 
generally must comply with these changes regardless of the impact on 
their operations, although contractual provisions (such as stabilization 
clauses) and other domestic or international legal rules may limit the 
applicability of some (or, increasingly rarely, all) changes, as discussed 
further in Part II.C. 
Using the processes described above, governments have the 
opportunity to shape the types, design, and implementation of new 
investments in agriculture or forestry. Some of these processes are also 
relevant when governments seek to address the grievances related to 
ongoing investments. For example, a governmental entity may decide to 
cancel (or not grant) a license or permit required for operations, to 
request renegotiation of the investor-state contract, or to enact a law that 
creates new regulatory requirements. Actions that negatively affect an 
investment, however, may prompt an investor to seek relief, such as 
through lobbying or by bringing legal challenges in national or 
international courts or tribunals. 
B.  Land Grievances: Causes and Incentives for Redress 
1.  Common Causes of Land Grievances 
Investments in land for agriculture or forestry projects have led to 
numerous types of grievances on the part of local communities and 
individuals around the world.25 Documented grievances have occurred 
at all stages of the project cycle, sometimes starting even before project 
implementation.26 Grievances have arisen not only when the 
 
25. The discussion of land grievances in this sub-section draws primarily from the authors’ 
review of forty cases of grievances arising from agriculture or forestry investments, as well as 
interviews conducted by the authors with lawyers, advocates, and others who work with 
communities or host governments. See Land Deal Dilemmas: Grievances, Human Rights, and 
Investor Protections, COLUMBIA CTR. ON SUSTAINABLE INV. 
http://ccsi.columbia.edu/work/projects/land-grievances/ (last visited Nov. 26, 2017) (containing a 
list of examples of grievances and allegations). 
26. See, e.g., Rhett Butler, Malaysian Palm Oil Giant Loses PNG Case, Plantations Declared 
Illegal, MONGABAY (May 24, 2014), https://news.mongabay.com/2014/05/malaysian-palm-oil-
giant-loses-png-case-plantations-declared-illegal (“[t]he people of Collingwood Bay have spoken 
clearly through the voices of our chiefs that we are against large scale palm oil development on 
our lands”); Villagers Secure Victory Over Malaysian Land Grabbers in Papua New Guinea, 
FARMLANDGRAB.ORG (May 21, 2014), https://farmlandgrab.org/23526 (noting that even though 
the people of Collingwood Bay were ultimately successful in their battle for their land they are 
still mindful of the “innocent families and other communities struggling [throughout] the country 
with the same problem”). 
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government transferred the land in question, but also when the land was 
provided by a local community or individuals.27 While land grievances 
are context-specific, and any particular grievance is unique to the 
project and the affected community, issues that appear especially likely 
to create or exacerbate grievances include: 
Displacement from land and resources (whether physical or 
economic,28 and including concerns around a failure to obtain free, 
prior, and informed consent (“FPIC”), a lack of adequate consultation, 
and inadequate compensation); 
Negative effects on the environment or cultural sites (which may 
be inherent to the project—for instance, the razing of forested land to 
make way for a greenfield palm oil plantation—or may be caused by a 
failure to adequately mitigate such effects); 
Failure to realize benefits from projects (including grievances 
regarding the quality or quantity of jobs reserved for locals, or regarding 
the provision of infrastructure or social services); 
Violence,29 intimidation, the repression of protests, or 
 
27. See, e.g., Final Monitoring Report: On the Operations and the Scale Down of Addax 
Bioenergy in Makeni, Sierra Leone, SIERRA LEONE NETWORK ON THE RIGHT TO FOOD 
(SILNORF) 3–6 (June 2016) (discussing grievances of community members in Bombali and 
Tonkolili districts concerning Addax Bioenergy Sierra Leone Ltd.’s Makeni project). See Jennifer 
Kennedy, Sierra Leone Farmers Evicted for Sugarcane Biofuel Plantations, CORPWATCH BLOG 
(Mar. 5, 2013), http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=15822 (discussing the fallout from 
people losing their farms); see also Memorandum of Understanding & Agreement Between the 
Gov’t of the Republic of Sierra Leone, Addax Bioenergy Sierra Leone Ltd. and Addax & Oryx 
Holdings BV, art. 2 (Feb. 9, 2010) (allowing for land clearance). 
28. The IFC Performance Standards on Environmental and Social Sustainability define 
physical displacement as “relocation or loss of shelter” and economic displacement as “loss of 
assets or access to assets that leads to loss of income sources or other means of livelihood.” INT’L 
FIN. CORP., PERFORMANCE STANDARD 5: LAND ACQUISITION AND INVOLUNTARY 
RESETTLEMENT 1, ¶ 1 (Jan. 1, 2012). 
29. At the most extreme, this can even result in fatalities, including of innocent bystanders. 
The advocacy group Global Witness has documented more than a thousand murders of land and 
environmental defenders since 2002, including in the context of land-based investments. In 2015, 
Global Witness found twenty killings that were linked to “[a]gribusiness grabbing land for large-
scale plantations,” and 185 murders in total. On Dangerous Ground, GLOBAL WITNESS 18 (June 
20, 2016), https://www.globalwitness.org/en/reports/dangerous-ground/; see also Deadly 
Environment: The Dramatic Rise in Killings of Environmental and Land Defenders, GLOBAL 
WITNESS 5, 13 (2014), https://www.globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/environmental-
activists/deadly-environment/ (documenting 908 land/environmental defenders killed in thirty-
five countries between 2002 and 2013, and arguing that an increasing death rate is linked to 
commercial pressures on land). In Cambodia, for example, the military stormed a village to carry 
out a forced eviction after an investor allegedly encroached on community members’ farms. The 
military’s action resulted in the death of a fourteen-year-old girl hit by gunfire. U.S. DEP’T OF 
STATE, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND LABOR, CAMBODIA 2012 HUMAN 
RIGHTS REPORT (2013); CAMBODIAN LEAGUE FOR THE PROMOTION AND DEFENSE OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS, ATTACKS & THREATS AGAINST HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS IN CAMBODIA 11 (Dec. 
2012) [hereinafter CAMBODIAN DEFENDERS]. 
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inappropriate detentions or arrests (all of which can be part of a 
downward spiral in which investments create grievances; individuals or 
communities air these grievances through demonstrations or other 
advocacy strategies, and the investor or the government then attempts to 
clamp down on such actions through violence or arrests30); and 
Illegality,31 potential corruption32 or conflicts of interest, and 
lack of transparency (which are not always the initial cause of 
investment-related concerns, but which can exacerbate grievances and 
create additional frustration, and may be highlighted in advocacy or 
legal actions against the investment). 
Of the forty cases reviewed for this research, displacement from land 
and resources was the most common source of grievances. Because land 
is often important both as an economic asset and for social, cultural, 
political, or spiritual reasons, displacement can be devastating. At times, 
investments can be linked to the physical and/or economic displacement 
of thousands of individuals.33 Although governments may describe 
public or state land as “available” for investment, such land is often 
occupied, used, or relied on by local communities or individuals.34 On 
 
30. See CAMBODIAN DEFENDERS, supra note 29, at 13 (discussing the inappropriate violence 
accompanying arrests). 
31. For example, in Cambodia, government officials have granted economic land concessions 
that have not met requisite pre-conditions, that exceed legal size limits, or that otherwise run 
contrary to applicable laws. U.N. OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, 
ECONOMIC LAND CONCESSIONS IN CAMBODIA: A HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVE, ¶¶ 8–12 (June 
2007). In Papua New Guinea, a Commission of Inquiry investigating Special Agriculture & 
Business Leases found that multiple leases failed to comply with statutory requirements, and 
ultimately recommended replacing the entire system of leases due to serious abuses. John 
Numapo, Final Report, COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO THE SPECIAL AGRICULTURE AND 
BUSINESS LEASES (SABL) (June 24, 2013), 
https://pngexposed.files.wordpress.com/2013/12/numapo-sabl-final-report.pdf. 
32. OLIVIER DE SCHUTTER, TAINTED LANDS: CORRUPTION IN LARGE-SCALE LAND DEALS, 
INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY ROUNDTABLE AND GLOBAL WITNESS (Nov. 
2016). 
33. See, e.g., Koh Kong sugar plantation lawsuits (re Cambodia), BUSINESS & HUMAN 
RIGHTS RESOURCE CENTRE, http://business-humanrights.org/en/koh-kong-sugar-plantation-
lawsuits-re-cambodia (last visited Nov. 26, 2017) (discussing the provincial court complaint filed 
against Koh Kong Plantation and Koh Kong Sugar Industry in Cambodia by 4,000 villagers). 
Oxfam estimates 22,500 people were evicted between 2004 and 2010 following the granting of 
licenses by the Ugandan National Forestry Authority. See also MATT GRAINGER & KATE GEARY, 
THE NEW FORESTS COMPANY AND ITS UGANDA PLANTATIONS, OXFAM CASE STUDY 2 (Sept. 
2011) (outlining instances where individuals have been displaced as a result of these licenses. The 
authors note that Francis, once a model farmer who is now “‘one of the poorest’ . . . . is among 
more than twenty thousand people who have been evicted from their homes and land in Kiboga 
district, and in nearby Mubende district, to make way for NFC plantations.”). 
34. Land governance regimes, and tenure rights within them, are quite context-specific. But in 
general, when land is deemed to be public or state land, the government has the right to decide 
how to use or allocate such land. This means that, although there may be individuals or 
communities who rely on such land for their livelihood strategies, the government may not need 
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the other hand, even when land is provided directly by communities or 
individuals, grievances regarding displacement may arise: for example, 
when communal land was provided without the support of all 
community members, or when individuals were intimidated into 
providing rights to use their land. Under either scenario, displacement 
can reduce food security and negatively affect well-being, particularly 
when compensation is inadequate.35 
The case of U.S.-based Herakles Capital’s investment in South-West 
Cameroon, which centered on a concession for over 73,000 hectares of 
oil palm plantations,36 illustrates the multiple types of grievances that 
can arise from a single project. Allies of communities affected by the 
project claimed that meaningful consultation processes had not taken 
place, and argued that the FPIC of each affected community had not 
been obtained, as the agreement of certain traditional authorities and 
elders alone, without participation of the broader community, fell far 
short of the FPIC standard.37 It was further alleged that the project 
would lead to the loss of lands and resources on which local 
 
to technically acquire that land from them. In contexts where land is not deemed to be owned or 
controlled by the government, a government may decide to acquire land—on a voluntary or 
compulsory basis, and within the boundaries of what is permitted under domestic law—for 
investments. It may do this preemptively or for specific projects; the latter scenario is more 
comparable to how the government of the United States, for example, has used its power of 
eminent domain. 
35. One example of this comes from Uganda, where a British company’s investment in timber 
plantations allegedly led to the evictions of thousands of local community members. LAND AND 
POWER: THE GROWING SCANDAL SURROUNDING THE NEW WAVE OF INVESTMENTS IN LAND, 
151 OXFAM BRIEFING PAPER (Sept. 22, 2011). Those community members sought redress 
through both judicial and non-judicial means, including in the lodging of a complaint with the 
Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman of the International Finance Corporation. In that complaint, the 
communities noted that, “[a]s a result of this physical and economic displacement, the affected 
communities’ livelihoods have been significantly impaired. In particular, and due especially to 
decreased productive and income-earning potential, many families report . . . eating materially 
less well.” Letter from Barbara Stockin, Chief Exec., Oxfam GB & Jeremy Hobbs, Exec. Dir., 
Oxfam Int’l, to Meg Taylor, Compliance Adviser/Ombudsman, Int’l Fin. Corp. (Dec. 20, 2011) 
(on file with authors) (regarding New Forests Company, Namwasa Plantation; IFC financing via 
Agri-Vie Fund PCC). 
36. Sustainable Oils Cameroon, supra note 22. 
37. ANALYSIS OF SOME CONTESTED LEGAL ISSUES REGARDING THE HERAKLES 
FARMS/SGSOC’S OIL PALM PLANTATION PROJECT IN CAMEROON, THE LAND AND 
INVESTMENTS GROUP – SCIENCES PO LAW CLINIC § 4.3 (last viewed Aug. 22, 2017) [hereinafter 
SCIENCES PO]. While FPIC is a right reserved primarily for indigenous and tribal peoples under 
international human rights law, it is also required to be applied to all local peoples and 
communities under the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil’s Principles & Criteria. 
ROUNDTABLE ON SUSTAINABLE PALM OIL, PRINCIPLES AND CRITERIA FOR SUSTAINABLE PALM 
OIL PRODUCTION (Oct. 2007), 
http://www.rspo.org/file/RSPO%20Principles%20&%20Criteria%20Document.pdf (this 2007 
version was the version at issue). Herakles was a member of the RSPO until withdrawing in 
August 2012 while embroiled in an RSPO complaints process. 
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communities relied for their livelihood,38 increasing their risk of 
indirect or economic displacement. Predicted negative effects on the 
environment included the clearing of forests, reduction of biodiversity, 
and increased release of greenhouse gases.39 In addition, local activists 
and organizations focusing on the project’s potential impacts on human 
rights and the environment asserted that they had experienced 
“intimidation, lawsuits, arrests, and violent attacks.”40 Two 
Cameroonian NGOs also alleged illegal activity by the company’s 
Cameroonian subsidiary, including “intimidation and bribery of 
community leaders, government officials, and local citizens . . . to gain 
land.”41 
2.  Responding to Land Grievances: Incentives and Challenges 
Host governments and investors may have various incentives for 
addressing land grievances. Grievances have triggered protests, 
litigation, international advocacy campaigns, and violent conflict, all of 
which can create reputational, financial, operational, and legal risks. 
Governments and investors that work to address land grievances as they 
arise have a better chance of mitigating, rather than exacerbating, these 
risks. 
Yet despite the compelling reasons to take remedial action, 
governments and investors alike can find it difficult to rectify land 
grievances in practice. In some instances, there may be no way to fully 
remedy certain actions, such as when a sacred site has been destroyed.42 
At other times, community disagreement on the appropriate remedies 
may entrench local opposition to any proposed remedial efforts. 
Additionally, internal disagreements within a government or the 
investing company may create obstacles that block effective efforts to 
address grievances. In addition, either a government or an investor 
might find that the other side is uninterested in addressing grievances. 
 
38. GREENPEACE, HERAKLES FARMS IN CAMEROON: A SHOWCASE IN BAD PALM OIL 
PRODUCTION 5, 13 (Feb. 2013) [hereinafter GREENPEACE]; SCIENCES PO, supra note 37, at § 4.6. 
39. GREENPEACE, supra note 38, at 5. 
40. Cameroon Activists on Trial for Peaceful Protest Against Wall Street Land Grabber, 
GRAIN (Jan. 30, 2014), https://www.grain.org/article/entries/4879-cameroon-activists-on-trial-for-
peaceful-protest-against-wall-street-land-grabber. 
41. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, U.S. NAT’L CONTACT POINT FOR THE OECD GUIDELINES FOR 
MULTINATIONAL ENTERS., Final Statement, Specific Instance Between the Center for 
Environment and Development (CED) with Network to Fight Against Hunger (RELUFA) and 
Herakles Farms’ Affiliate SG Sustainable Oils Cameroon (SGSOC) in Cameroon (July 28, 2015). 
42. See, e.g., Rubber Barons, GLOBAL WITNESS 16 (May 13, 2013), 
https://www.globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/land-deals/rubberbarons/ (explaining that “[i]n three 
villages near Hoang Anh Oyadav, Heng Brother and CRD’s rubber concessions, village chiefs 
and elders described how the companies had destroyed spirit forest sites and burial grounds”). 
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While challenging from either perspective, a government might find 
itself in the particularly unenviable position of trying to placate its 
citizens as well as the investor. 
Another potential complication concerns the attitude and actions of 
the investor’s home government. A supportive home government may 
attempt to pressure the host government to act favorably toward its 
outward investor, potentially rendering actions to address grievances at 
the expense of the investor even more unpalatable to the host 
government. For instance, in the aforementioned example from 
Cameroon, the home state of Herakles Capital—the United States—
privately urged the Cameroonian government to resolve disputes 
regarding the plantation, with a high-level U.S. official reportedly 
advising Cameroon to “act quickly” to “avoid arbitration or protracted 
legal proceedings.”43 This official also reportedly warned that a failure 
to act could have “a chilling effect on future foreign investment.”44 This 
allusion to arbitration and legal proceedings provides an example of 
how the threat of international investment law may loom over 
governmental efforts to redress land grievances. This may be so even if 
the host government also has legal obligations under international 
human rights law to restitute land allocated to an investor or to take 
other actions to provide redress to aggrieved community members. The 
web of international, domestic, and contractual legal obligations 
relevant to governments, and the challenges that arise at the intersection 
of these legal frameworks, are discussed below. 
II.  LEGAL OBLIGATIONS, REDRESS MECHANISMS, AND CHALLENGES OF 
INTERSECTING LEGAL FRAMEWORKS 
A government’s legal obligations may influence its approach to 
addressing land grievances. This Section discusses the obligations and 
 
43. According to a U.S. diplomatic cable that was accessed through a Freedom of Information 
Act request, when a high-level U.S. official visited Cameroon, the official raised the topic of 
ongoing disputes related to the plantation, including a stop work order issued by the Minister of 
Forests and Wildlife. The cable notes that the official: 
[U]rged the Prime Minister to make a decision and take action to resolve the dispute. She 
told [the Prime Minister] that the United States does not want to tell Cameroon what 
decision to make, but Cameroon should act quickly and avoid arbitration or protracted legal 
proceedings. She warned that a failure to act could cause uncertainty in the local business 
climate and have a chilling effect on future foreign investment. 
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, COMMERCIAL ISSUES DOMINATE DAS AKUTETEHS CAMEROON VISIT, 
DOC. NO. CO5446286 (May 31, 2013), 
https://www.oaklandinstitute.org/sites/oaklandinstitute.org/files/us-embassy-cables-herakles-
farms-130531.pdf. 
44. Id. (noting, additionally, that “a failure to act could cause uncertainty in the local business 
climate”). 
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remedies found in three particularly relevant sources: international 
investment law, international human rights law, and investor-state 
contracts. It also considers some of the challenges arising at the 
interface of these legal frameworks. 
A.  International Investment Law 
International investment law is a rapidly developing area of law 
regulating governments’ treatment of foreign investors—with 
significant implications for governments as they seek to handle 
grievances arising from investments in land. International investment 
law’s remedial mechanisms render it relatively powerful: most, though 
not all, of the more than 3,000 existing investment treaties provide 
foreign investors with a direct private right of action to sue their host 
governments in international arbitration.45 These investor-state dispute 
settlement (“ISDS”) proceedings, which are typically determined by a 
panel of three arbitrators, do not generally require exhaustion of 
domestic remedies.46 
Monetary damages awarded by arbitrators for violations of the 
applicable investment treaty may cover both past losses and lost future 
profits. Some awards have been for staggering sums, both as an absolute 
number and as a proportion of government expenditures.47 Even 
governments that ultimately prevail in an arbitration may be forced to 
expend significant time and resources in defending the claim,48 and may 
 
45. As of December 15, 2017, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) had “mapped’ 2,573 investment treaties. Of those 2,573 treaties, UNCTAD found 
that 2,442 provided for investor-state dispute settlement. That information is available at 
UNCTAD’s website http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/. 
46. For an overview of investor-state disputes, see JESWALD SALACUSE, THE LAW OF 
INVESTMENT TREATIES 392–435 (Oxford Int’l Law Library, 2d ed. 2015); M. SORNARAJAH, THE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 172–235 (Cambridge Univ. Press, 3d ed. 2010). 
47. As noted by Lauge Poulsen, a 2003 award against the Czech Republic for USD $350 
million damages was: 
[E]qual to the entire health budget of the Czech government and effectively doubled the 
public-sector deficit for the year. Nine years later a split tribunal awarded an American 
company $2.37 billion [USD] in compensation from Ecuador including interest . . . The 
award amounted to almost 7 per cent of the Ecuadorian government’s total government 
budget and, adjusted for GDP, an equivalent award against the United Kingdom would be 
almost $70 billion [USD] and for the United States $458 billion [USD]. 
LAUGE N. SKOVGAARD POULSEN, BOUNDED RATIONALITY AND ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY: THE 
POLITICS OF INVESTMENT TREATIES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 3 (Cambridge Univ. Press, 
2015). The award against Ecuador was subsequently reduced on annulment, due to the fact that 
the claimants did not own 100 percent of the investment, but had been ordered damages 
corresponding to 100 percent of the value of the investment. Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. The 
Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/11, Decision on Annulment of the Award, ¶¶ 
136–302, 585–86 (Nov. 2, 2015). 
48. Matthew Hodgson, Counting the Costs of Investment Treaty Arbitration, GLOBAL 
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not be able to recoup those costs even if they are successful in their 
defense.49 Governments concerned about arbitration claims50 may thus 
be wary of addressing land grievances in a way that interferes with an 
investment, even in circumstances in which the public interest would 
justify or even require such interference. 
International investment treaties commonly contain a core set of 
obligations regulating governments’ conduct. These include: obligations 
not to treat foreign investors less favorably than domestic investors (the 
“national treatment” obligation) or less favorably than foreign investors 
from another state (the “most-favored nation treatment” obligation); the 
obligation to provide foreign investors “fair and equitable treatment;” 
the obligation to provide foreign investors “full protection and 
security;” the obligation to ensure any expropriation is accompanied by 
payment of compensation; and the obligation to adhere to any 
commitment entered into with or owed to foreign investors (the 
“umbrella clause”).51 
Investment arbitration tribunals have interpreted these obligations 
differently, and are not bound by precedent. Combined with the varied 
and oft-vague language used in treaties, it is difficult to declare 
definitively what any one obligation requires. 
 
ARBITRATION REVIEW (Mar. 24, 2014), http://globalarbitrationreview.com/news/article/32513/. 
49. Id. (discussing rules on allocation of costs, and finding that states who are found not liable 
for breaching the treaty may nevertheless be required to bear their legal costs as well as at least a 
portion of costs of the arbitration); see also Memorandum from Iván Zarak A., Acting Minister of 
Econ. & Fin. to Meg Kinnear, Secretary-General, Int’l Ctr. for Settlement of Inv. Disputes (Sept. 
12, 2016) (discussing problems that those states that have received cost awards from tribunals 
have faced when seeking to enforce cost awards against judgment-proof claimants). 
50. Conversely, governments may also be caught off-guard by the relevance of investment 
treaties, as investment arbitration tribunals have taken a relatively permissive approach toward 
allowing companies to structure or restructure their holdings so as to gain treaty protection, and to 
use parent or intermediate companies to secure treaty coverage for their investments. Gold 
Reserve Inc. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venez., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/09/1, Award, ¶¶ 248–
72 (Sept. 22, 2014); Saluka Invs. BV v. The Czech Republic, Partial Award, ¶¶ 239–42 
(UNCITRAL Arb. Mar. 17, 2006). Some investment arbitration tribunals have even permitted 
nationals of the host state to obtain treaty protection by “roundtripping”—i.e., establishing a 
corporate entity in a foreign country and routing investments from the host state through the 
foreign entity back to the host state. Tokios Tokelés v. Ukr., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/18, 
Decision on Jurisdiction (Apr. 29, 2004). In addition, some tribunals have determined that even 
indirect and minority non-controlling shareholders can initiate arbitrations, potentially exposing 
the government to multiple suits arising out of the same underlying issue. See, e.g., TECO Guat. 
Holdings LLC v. The Republic of Guat., ICSID Case No. ARB/10/17, Award, ¶ 79 (Dec. 19, 
2013) (finding that the electricity company which holds an indirect share may initiate arbitration); 
Iberdrola Energía S.A. v. La Republica de Guat., ICSID Case No. ARB/09/5, Award, ¶ 278 (Aug. 
17, 2012) (discussing the claims of an indirect shareholder). 
51. For overviews of these treaty standards, see SALACUSE, supra note 46, at 422 (discussing 
the incorporation of arbitration into treaties); SORNARAJAH, supra, note 46, at 183–87 (discussing 
reasons for making bilateral investment treaties). 
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For example, the non-discrimination provisions have been interpreted 
to prohibit de jure discrimination against foreign investors on account of 
the investors’ nationality, as well as de facto discrimination.52 While 
different treatment of differently situated or “unlike” investors is 
permitted,53 the test for determining “likeness” is not clear. Indeed, the 
outcome in a dispute may depend on the intensity with which a tribunal 
decides to scrutinize governments’ decisions to distinguish between 
investors.54 The role of intent and nationality is also disputed: Some 
tribunals have found that a government’s different treatment of 
investors or investments––though not based on or a result of the 
investors’ nationality––may also be unjustified, unreasonable, or 
illegitimate.55 
The fair and equitable treatment (“FET”) obligation is another core 
obligation that has been interpreted in divergent ways. The FET 
obligation may be considered the most extensive obligation in terms of 
the range of duties that it has been interpreted to impose on states56 and 
 
52. See, e.g., Clayton v. Gov’t of Can., PCA Case No. 2009–04, ¶¶ 685–731 (Mar. 17, 2015) 
(finding that the government of Canada discriminated against the foreign investors and their 
investment by treating their proposed mining project less favorably than other mining projects, 
but declining to conclude that the adverse treatment was due to the investors’ foreign nationality). 
53. See Freya Baetens, Discrimination on the Basis of Nationality: Determining Likeness in 
Human Rights and Investment Law, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND COMPARATIVE 
PUBLIC LAW 279 (Stephen Schill ed., 2010) (discussing different treatment bases for different 
nations); Jurgen Kurtz, The Merits and Limits of Comparativism: National Treatment in 
International Investment Law and the WTO, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND 
COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW 243 (Stephen Schill ed., 2010) (discussing comparativism in 
treatment of parties). 
54. Compare Occidental Exploration & Prod. Co. v. The Republic of Ecuador, LCIA Case 
No. UN3467, Award, ¶¶ 167–77 (July 1, 2004) (investors in the business of growing and 
exporting flowers were “like” investors engaged in extracting and exporting oil, and therefore did 
not warrant different treatment under the country’s value-added tax system), with Parkerings-
Compagniet AS v. Republic of Lith., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/8, Award, ¶¶ 375–97 (Sept. 11, 
2007) (two investors seeking a government concession for the same investment activity were not 
“like” due to the fact that their respective projects had different potential impacts in the host 
community). 
55. See, e.g., Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Gov’t of Can., Award on the Merits of Phase 2, ¶ 78 
(UNCITRAL Arb. Apr. 10, 2001) (differences in treatment will presumptively violate Article 
1102(2), unless they have a reasonable nexus to rational government policies that (1) do not 
distinguish, on their face or de facto, between foreign-owned and domestic companies, and (2) do 
not otherwise unduly undermine the investment liberalizing objectives of NAFTA); Feldman v. 
Mex., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1, Award, ¶¶ 183–84 (Dec. 16, 2002) (holding that the 
distinction between citizenship and nationality is irrelevant to the interim decision); Clayton, PCA 
Case No. 2009–04, ¶¶ 723–24. 
56. In addition to contentions that the FET standard protects “legitimate expectations,” 
commentators have asserted that it also imposes duties of good faith, transparency, non-
arbitrariness, procedural and substantive due process, legality under domestic law, consistency, 
and proportionality. See, e.g., Cervin Investissements S.A. v. Costa Rica, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/13/2, Final Award, ¶¶ 460–71 (Mar. 7, 2017) (holding that granting a “fair and equitable 
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the frequency with which tribunals have found a violation.57 
At present, there are two main approaches to understanding the FET 
obligation.58 Under one approach, the FET standard embodies the 
minimum standard of treatment under customary international law: a 
floor of conduct below which no state is allowed to fall, identified 
through an assessment of state practice and opinio juris. Under the other 
approach, the FET standard is an “autonomous” standard of treatment: 
not tethered to the minimum standard of treatment, but rather a more 
nebulous standard based on a tribunal’s interpretation of the treaty.59 
This autonomous standard, which is more commonly applied, has been 
interpreted as embodying a range of requirements that may go well 
beyond the norms of customary international law and is more likely to 
result in state liability than the standard tied to customary international 
law.60 
Under this standard, the FET obligation has been interpreted to place 
a number of requirements on states, from protecting an investor’s 
“legitimate expectations” formed in reliance on the government’s 
explicit assurances or implicit conduct61 to maintaining the “stability” 
 
treatment” implies that the parties conduct themselves according to justice, reason, and equity 
with respect to investments and income of investors); TECO Guat. Holdings LLC v. The 
Republic of Guat., ICSID Case No. ARB/10/23, Award, ¶¶ 443–65 (Dec. 19, 2013) (determining 
that if the claimant proves that the other party acted arbitrarily and with willful disregard of the 
applicable framework, this behavior would constitute a breach of the minimum standard); MTD 
Equity v. Republic of Chile, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/7, Award, ¶ 89 (May 25, 2004) (explaining 
that a party’s responsibility is limited to the consequences of its own actions to the extent that 
they breached the obligation to treat the other party fairly and equitably). 
57. Data indicate that of the cases for which information about investor claims is known, 80 
percent involved FET claims (341 out of 425 cases); additionally, of the cases decided against 
investors on known grounds, 65 percent involved a finding that the state breached the FET 
obligation (eighty-four cases decided against investors on known grounds). This data is based on 
a search of UNCTAD’s database on December 14, 2015. The database is available at 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/FilterByBreaches. Updated data regarding the total 
number of cases in the database, the total number in which FET claims were brought, and the 
total number cases in which FET violations were found can all be found on that page. 
58. Some commentators and tribunals differ on whether and to what extent these two 
approaches are actually distinct. One notion that has been argued by investors and accepted by 
some tribunals is that there remains little difference in practice between the two standards, as the 
two have converged over time through the minimum standard of treatment evolving and rising to 
meet the “autonomous” FET obligation. 
59. See David Gaukrodger, Addressing the Balance of Interests in Investment Treaties: The 
Limitation of Fair and Equitable Treatment Provisions to the Minimum Standard of Treatment 
under Customary International Law 6 (OECD Working Papers on Int’l Inv. 2017/03, 2017) 
(addressing fair and equitable treatment provisions in investment treaties). 
60. Id. at 10–13. 
61. See, e.g., Gold Reserve Inc. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venez., ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/09/1, Award, ¶¶ 570–76 (Sept. 22, 2014); see also Perenco Ecuador Ltd. v. The 
Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/6, Decision on the Remaining Issues of 
Jurisdiction and on Liability, ¶ 560 (Sept. 12, 2014); Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret Ve Sanayi 
 
2017] Land Grievances and Legal Liability 533 
of the legal and economic environment.62 While the words “fair and 
equitable” may therefore appear innocuous, the ways in which they 
have been interpreted by tribunals may raise significant concerns for 
governments seeking to address potential or actual grievances 
surrounding large-scale investments in land. In particular, the FET 
obligation can result in liability for government actions that impact 
performance of existing concessions, as well as affect the nature and 
scope of investor rights related to a concession. 
For example, some investment arbitration tribunals have effectively 
allowed investors to transform their “legitimate expectations” about 
concessions or other investments into enforceable property rights, even 
if such rights do not exist under domestic law. One example is found in 
the case of Awdi v. Romania,63 which centered on two decisions by the 
Constitutional Court of Romania finding that property rights claimed by 
the investors were invalid.64 The Court’s first decision had invalidated 
the investors’ title to contested property (on the ground that the 
government had wrongfully expropriated the land from its previous 
owners in 1950 and therefore never possessed valid title that could have 
been transferred to the investors when the government subsequently 
sought to privatize that property); the second had found unconstitutional 
a national law granting the investors a forty-nine-year concession for 
lands rented from various local governments. In a subsequent action 
brought by the investors against Romania under an investment treaty, 
the arbitration tribunal did not find fault with the Constitutional Court’s 
process or decisions. Nevertheless, the tribunal determined that the 
investors’ legitimate expectations had been breached and must be 
compensated.65 In this way, the Constitutional Court’s authoritative 
determination over the validity of the property rights under domestic 
law led to a breach of the government’s FET obligation. 
These and other obligations flowing from investment treaties have 
ramifications for the governance of land-based investments and 
 
A.S. v. Islamic Republic of Pak., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/29, Award, ¶¶ 178–79 (Aug. 27, 
2009). 
62. See, e.g., PSEG Glob. Inc. v. Republic of Turk., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/5, Award, ¶¶ 
250–55 (Jan. 19, 2007) (discussing the need for a stable business environment in which investors 
can safely operate); CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/01/8, Award, ¶ 274 (May 12, 2005) (“There can be no doubt, therefore, that a stable legal 
and business environment is an essential element of fair and equitable treatment.”); Occidental 
Expl. & Prod. Co. v. The Republic of Ecuador, Case No. UN3467, Final Award, ¶ 183 (London 
Ct. of Int’l Arb. 2004) (discussing stability in the same vein). 
63. Awdi v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/13, Award, (Mar. 2, 2015). 
64. Id. at ¶ 327. 
65. Id. at ¶ 532. 
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governments’ options for addressing related grievances. And yet, it is 
likely inappropriate for host states to seek to shape their conduct in a 
way that fully avoids all potential investment treaty risks. Risks of 
liability tied to investment treaty obligations should not, for example, 
discourage good faith actions designed to comply with human rights 
obligations. Whether and how international investment law can better 
accommodate public interest objectives and human rights obligations 
remains an issue ripe for continued interrogation. 
B.  International Human Rights Law 
Whereas international investment law obligates governments to 
protect investors in certain situations, international human rights law 
sets out fundamental protections for individuals and peoples, including 
those who risk being negatively affected by investments.66 
The sources of human rights law are less fragmented than those of 
international investment law: There are fewer than a dozen core human 
rights treaties at the international level,67 supplemented by other 
relevant multilateral treaties (such as International Labour Organisation 
Conventions)68 and regional human rights treaties in Africa, the 
Americas, and Europe. Human rights redress mechanisms are also 
provided through more established fora, including regional human 
rights courts, regional human rights commissions, and complaints 
mechanisms tied to specific treaties. 
These human rights redress mechanisms differ from investment 
arbitration processes in ways that arguably lead to stronger avenues of 
redress for investors than for individuals whose human rights have been 
violated. For instance, human rights fora generally require claimants to 
first exhaust available domestic remedies, which is usually not required 
 
66. In some cases, investors have also sought protections under human rights law related to 
the right to property. See, e.g., Rosenzweig & Bonded Warehouses Ltd. v. Pol., Eur. Ct. H.R. 
App. No. 51728/99, Judgment, ¶ 48 (July 28, 2005) (discussing the importance of balancing “the 
individual’s fundamental rights”); Zlinsat Spol. S.R.O. v. Bulg., Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 
57785/00, Judgment, ¶ 2 (Jan. 10, 2008) (discussing minimum protections “to which individuals 
and legal entities were entitled under the rule of law in a democratic society”). 
67. The Core International Human Rights Instruments and their Monitoring Bodies, U.N. 
OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CoreInstruments.aspx. (last visited Nov. 27, 
2017). 
68. See, e.g., International Labour Organization, Convention Concerning Indigenous and 
Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries art. 27, June 27, 1989, ILO Convention 169, 1650 
U.N.T.S. 383 (particularly relevant for land grievances, as it sets out legally binding requirements 
for States Parties regarding free, prior and informed consent). In addition, all International Labour 
Organization member states are required to comply with the rights set out in the ILO Declaration 
on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work. 
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for investment arbitration proceedings. In addition, investment 
arbitration decisions are relatively easy to enforce in courts around the 
world.69 
States that have ratified human rights treaties have obligations to 
respect, protect, and fulfill the human rights codified therein.70 They 
thus must refrain from violating those rights, prevent third parties from 
violating those rights, and take steps to facilitate the enjoyment of those 
rights.71 Soft law instruments, such as UN declarations and widely 
endorsed guidelines, help in interpreting human rights law contained in 
binding treaties.72 
While land-based investment can affect a range of human rights, the 
rights most commonly affected can be loosely grouped into three 
categories: human rights tied to land occupation and use; other human 
rights at risk for those living on, near, or downstream from concession 
areas; and human rights of employees and contractors. The specific 
rights falling into these three categories include: the right to property; 
the right to FPIC; the prohibition of forced eviction; the rights to 
housing, water, food, health, and a healthy environment; the right to 
self-determination; the rights to peaceful assembly and freedom of 
expression; the rights to life and to liberty and security of person; and 
the right to just and favorable conditions of work, as well as the rights to 
form and join trade unions and to freedom of association.73 
 
69. Ease of enforcement results from two treaties. See Convention on the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 
1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter ICSID Convention]; United Nations Convention on 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 
U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter New York Convention]. These two agreements bind States Parties to 
recognize, enforce, and comply with arbitral awards, except under limited conditions. 
70. Human rights instruments create binding obligations for states that have ratified them. 
States that have signed a treaty but not yet ratified it are prohibited from taking steps to 
undermine rights set out in the treaty. In addition, some human rights are considered to be binding 
under customary international law, and therefore bind states regardless of whether or not they 
have ratified a treaty setting out such rights. 
71. International Human Rights Law, U.N. OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN 
RIGHTS, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/InternationalLaw.aspx (last visited 
Nov. 28, 2017). 
72. While scholars’ perspectives vary, soft law is generally considered to be quasi-legal rules 
that do not constitute legally binding obligations. See, e.g., Andrew T. Guzman & Timothy L. 
Meyer, International Soft Law, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 171, 172–74 (2010) (setting forth 
explanations for soft law as more broadly described than before). 
73. Most of these human rights are explicitly protected in different binding human rights 
instruments. See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, S. TREATY DOC. No. 95-19, 
6 I.L.M. 360, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (1967). A few of the specific human rights listed above have been 
authoritatively interpreted to exist based on legally binding instruments: for example, the right to 
water and the prohibition against forced evictions. See, e.g., U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. 
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Government obligations related to these rights also have important 
implications for how governments address land grievances. Grievances 
arising from land-based investments frequently involve failures of the 
government to respect or protect certain rights. Efforts to redress those 
grievances should thus be done in a rights-compliant manner to ensure 
that the government meets its legal obligations under human rights law. 
C.  Investor-State Contracts 
Apart from the legal obligations established by international 
investment law and by international human rights law, governments also 
have legal obligations that they assume vis-à-vis specific investors in 
the form of contracts with those investors.74 Investor-state contracts are 
often used in countries where the government sells, leases, or otherwise 
grants access to land for agriculture or forestry projects. These contracts 
delineate a range of rights and obligations incumbent on both the 
government and the investor. When used, such contracts are one of the 
most important sources of governmental legal obligations related to a 
land-based investment. 
Investor-state contracts differ in their complexity, as well as in their 
purported comprehensiveness. Some contracts, for example, explicitly 
note that the investor must receive additional permits or approvals, 
while others may endeavor to settle all relevant issues related to the 
underlying project, including by obligating the government to ensure 
that any requisite authorizations are provided as needed.75 
One of the more contentious types of provisions included in some 
investor-state contracts is the stabilization clause, which addresses how 
changes in the law of the host state will affect the contract. Broad 
stabilization clauses may aim to apply to all domestic laws; more 
 
On Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 15: The Right to Water, U.N. Doc. 
E/C.12/2002/11 (Jan. 20, 2003); U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. On Econ., Soc. & Cultural 
Rights, General Comment No. 7: The Right to Adequate Housing: Forced Evictions, U.N. Doc. 
E/1998/22 (May 20, 1997). 
74. Investor-state contracts are completely separate from international investment treaties. 
Whereas investment treaties are agreements between governments that govern protection of 
covered investors and investments operating in the jurisdictions of the treaties’ parties, investor-
state contracts are simply agreements between a government and an investor that specifically 
allocate rights and risks between those contracting parties, generally in the context of a specific 
investment project. 
75. See, e.g., Sustainable Oils Cameroon, supra note 22, at art. 4, § 4.11(c) (freezing the list of 
authorizations needed, noting that they shall be provided without payments, and stating that the 
“Government undertakes to promptly provide to Investor, and to cause any Governmental 
Authority to provide to Investor all certificates, exemptions, waivers, consents, licenses, permits, 
easements, documents and other authorizations, to the extent any of the foregoing are or may be 
desirable or necessary. . . ”). 
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narrow ones are drafted to apply only to certain topics (for example, tax 
laws).76 Some stabilization clauses seek to essentially “freeze” the law 
in effect on the day the contract is signed, while others seek to ensure 
“economic equilibrium” by obligating the government to compensate 
the investor for losses incurred in complying with new laws.77 Still 
other stabilization clauses aim for a combination of both objectives.78 
Given that stabilization clauses can potentially affect applicability of 
domestic laws protecting human rights, labor rights, or the environment, 
they are generally discouraged.79  
Investor-state contracts frequently cover the process to be used in 
addressing disputes arising out of or in connection with the contract. 
Many provide for commercial arbitration under the same or similar rules 
that govern arbitration arising out of investment treaties. As with 
investment arbitration, these commercial arbitrations often occur outside 
of the host country.80 Even when an international investor has 
incorporated an entity in the jurisdiction in which it is investing, the 
contract may still assert that it is to be considered a foreign investor for 
 
76. Guide to Land Contracts: Forestry Projects, INT’L SENIOR LAWYERS PROJECT 26–27 
(Jan. 2017), http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2017/01/GuidetoLandContracts-ForestryProjects.pdf. 




78. Id. at 26–28. 
79. Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV. 19, 21–
22 (2011), http://www.oecd.org/corporate/mne/48004323.pdf. See also Principles for Responsible 
Contracts: Integrating the Management of Human Rights Risks into State-Investor Contract 
Negotiations, U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R 15–19 (Principle 4) (2015) 
[hereinafter U.N. Responsible Contracts] (discussing the risks that stabilization clauses pose for 
states seeking to meet their human rights obligations, and noting that, if used, the contracts should 
be carefully drafted to ensure that the state remains able to meet its obligations under human 
rights law). 
80. A number of publicly available investor-state contracts relating to investments in land and 
agriculture illustrate this practice. See, e.g., Memorandum of Understanding Between the Gov’t of 
The Republic of Sierra Leone & Sierra Land Dev. Ltd., art. 8(i) (Apr. 25, 2014), 
http://www.openlandcontracts.org/contract/ocds-591adf-2317427356/view#/pdf (providing that 
“[a]ll [d]isputes shall be referred to and finally resolved by arbitration in London”); Sub-lease 
Between Dr. Joseph Sam Sesay & Socfin Agric. Co. Ltd., art. 5.2 (a) (Mar. 5, 2011), 
http://www.openlandcontracts.org/contract/ocds-591adf-2434433566/view#/pdf (including in the 
contract that “all disputes shall be referred to and finally resolved by arbitration in London before 
three arbitrators”); Concession Agreement Between the Gov’t of Liber. & the Md. Oil Palm 
Plantation, §§ 26.2–26.3 (Mar. 4, 2011), http://www.openlandcontracts.org/contract/ocds-591adf-
5085611127/view#/pdf (providing that any disputes are to be resolved by arbitration in London 
and administered by the London Court of International Arbitration); Inv. Agreement Between The 
Republic of Liber. & Liber. Forest Prods. Inc., § 24.6 (May 22, 2008) 
http://www.openlandcontracts.org/contract/ocds-591adf-0122591393/view#/pdf (providing for 
arbitration of disputes arising under the contract and specifying that such arbitrations are to take 
place in Washington, D.C., “or such other place as the Parties may agree”). 
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the purposes of any disputes related to the investment.81 
In general, investor-state contracts are subordinate to domestic law. 
However, as discussed in the following Section, contractual provisions 
and investment treaties may work to shield investors from having to 
comply with aspects of the domestic law. 
D.  Challenges of Intersecting Legal Frameworks 
A government’s obligations under these distinct legal frameworks 
and agreements interact in complicated ways. At times, some 
obligations may reinforce or elevate other obligations; conversely, 
obligations may be in tension or may even be in conflict. To date, 
international tribunals (in both the investment and the human rights 
regimes) have not provided clear guidance to governments on how to 
deal with potentially conflicting obligations. In light of the stronger 
enforceability mechanisms found in international investment law, these 
interactions between legal obligations may complicate a government’s 
interest in or ability to comply with its human rights obligations—or to 
address its citizens’ grievances arising from land investments. 
Understanding how some of these obligations may reinforce or 
elevate other obligations is key to the argument this Article sets out in 
Part IV. The most dramatic example is the potential for international 
investment law, as it has been applied by tribunals, to elevate to a 
supranational level a state’s contractual and quasi-contractual 
commitments (such as those made in an investor-state contract or 
through a government official’s separate representations to an investor). 
How is this possible? Contracts, including those signed by a 
government, are generally subordinate to domestic law. They provide a 
specific set of governance rules, and allocate rights and obligations 
between parties, for a specific arrangement that is otherwise governed 
by domestic law. They can help to fill gaps in domestic law. They can 
even strive to modify or circumvent application of domestic law as 
applied to a specific project—for example, through the provision of 
special fiscal arrangements, through the imposition of specialized rules 
on available remedies, or with the use of stabilization clauses, as 
discussed above. Yet whether such attempts to modify or circumvent 
 
81. See, e.g., Act Ratifying the Concession Agreement Between The Republic of Liber. & 
LIBINC Oil Palm Inc., § 24.3 (May 22, 2008), http://www.openlandcontracts.org/contract/ocds-
591adf-6459881214/view#/ (“Notwithstanding the incorporation in Liberia of LIBINCO, 
LIBINCO shall be treated as a Person that is a national of the United States of America for 
purposes of the Convention and of this Agreement.”). At the time the contract was ratified, the 
company was a wholly owned subsidiary of Equatorial Palm Oil, PLC, which is a UK publicly 
listed company. 
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domestic law are acceptable, and even whether a contract in its entirety 
is legitimate, traditionally depends on the domestic law governing the 
contract. For example, a contract that seeks to stabilize certain aspects 
of applicable law may be permissible in some jurisdictions. In other 
jurisdictions, a court might determine that a stabilization clause is 
invalid and unenforceable in light of the domestic legal framework—for 
example, if the clause would improperly restrict governmental power to 
act in the public interest.82 
Yet, investment treaties mean that the governing domestic legal 
system may not be the only, or the last, system to interpret the validity 
of an investor-state contract, or aspects of it. Regardless of how a 
contract might be interpreted by an applicable domestic court, an 
investment arbitration tribunal interpreting an investor-state contract 
might adopt a different view. A tribunal could, for example, hold that 
promises made under (or even outside of) the contract that would not be 
binding or enforceable under domestic law are nevertheless valid and 
must be enforced under the investment treaty’s umbrella clause and/or 
in light of the government’s FET or expropriation obligations. In this 
way, international investment law can elevate contractual obligations 
above domestic law. This is in stark contrast to the traditional legal 
hierarchy, in which contracts are subordinate to domestic law. 
The effect of elevating contracts to a supranational level extends 
beyond the protection of particular contractual provisions that might 
otherwise be deemed invalid under domestic law. According to some 
arbitral tribunal decisions, it can also cover statements and promises that 
did not make their way into the contract, and can also potentially protect 
an entire contract that might have been found illegal or unenforceable.83 
Such outcomes are unlikely when the illegality is severe. For example, 
some investment arbitration tribunals have found that they cannot hear 
claims regarding contracts secured through fraud or corruption.84 Yet 
tribunals have proved willing to accept cases in which contracts are 
illegal for other reasons, such as when the government signatory was 
not authorized to sign, or when the contractual process did not comply 
with domestic legal requirements.85 
 
82. See Shemberg, supra note 77, at 33 (noting the clauses are generally not enforceable in 
common law countries, and difficult to enforce in civil law systems); see also, e.g., David Dana & 
Susan P. Koniak, Bargaining in the Shadow of Democracy, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 473, 485 (1999) 
(discussing some issues of enforceability in United States law). 
83. See cases cited infra note 154 (providing examples of cases that protect investors’ interests 
despite potential illegality contrary to host countries’ laws). 
84. See cases cited infra note 169 (providing examples of cases where tribunals have found 
contracts unenforceable for violating international public policy). 
85. See, e.g., Kardassopoulos v. The Republic of Geor., ICSID Case Nos. ARB/05/18 & 
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The web of legal obligations that bind governments may also produce 
obligations that are in tension and that, in particular circumstances, 
conflict with one another. While no inherent conflict necessarily exists 
between, for example, international investment law and international 
human rights law, these distinct legal regimes and how they are applied 
can, in specific situations, create the potential that actions taken by a 
state to address one set of stakeholders’ rights or interests may lead to 
liability for harming another set of stakeholders’ rights or interests. 
Actions to protect human rights may violate investor protections under a 
treaty or an investor’s rights under a contract; similarly, actions to 
protect investments may violate human rights. 
Consider, for example, an investor with contract rights to a land 
concession and investment treaty protections, and whose operations, or 
mere presence, are being challenged by a local community as infringing 
on their own rights. Perhaps the local community has lost access to land 
over which it had traditional or customary rights, protected under 
international law. The government may have a legal obligation under 
international human rights law to restitute that land to the community. 
Doing so, however, could infringe on the investor’s own rights under 
the contract or investment treaty.86 Failure to do so might constitute a 
continuing violation of the community’s human rights. This scenario is 
not too unlike the case described below, Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous 
Community v. Paraguay.87 
Any scenario in which a government’s obligations toward an investor 
might directly conflict with its obligations under human rights law 
raises an obvious question, but one that is often the elephant in the room 
that no one wishes to speak of: Isn’t this situation the fault of the 
government? In other words, if a government was already complying 
 
ARB/07/15, Award, ¶ 273 (Mar. 3, 2010) (finding concession in violation of Georgian law still 
valid because agreements “cloaked with the mantle of Governmental authority”); R.R. Dev. Corp. 
v. Republic of Guat., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/23, Award, ¶ 235 (June 29, 2012) (finding 
“grossly unfair” the attempt to exact concessions from a party who reasonably relied on 
governmental representations). 
86. Of course, international investment law does not completely tie the hands of 
government—indeed, treaties generally allow expropriation of property so long as it is coupled 
with just compensation. Yet the potential complications flowing from such an action can be 
daunting—an investor that disagrees with the expropriation process or amount of compensation, 
for example, could lodge claims under multiple standards, including regarding its “expectations” 
regarding performance of the contract, and whether the expropriation of the investor’s property 
was lawful, placing the government at risk of being found in breach of a treaty for actions 
undertaken to rectify human rights violations. Such a scenario can be further complicated when a 
government and investor disagree about the nature or even existence of the investor’s rights. 
87. Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Cmty. v. Para, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 146 (Mar. 29, 2006). 
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with its human rights obligations, then it would only accept or allow 
investments that are rights-compliant. And rights-compliant investments 
would not create scenarios in which a government would have to 
infringe on the investor’s rights in order to protect human rights. Under 
this line of reasoning, arguments that a government must take actions 
detrimental to the investor in order to comply with human rights are 
viewed with suspicion, for if the government truly cared, would it not 
have addressed human rights earlier? 
Not necessarily. There are many reasons why a government might 
find itself in such a scenario: a change to a more democratic or post-
conflict regime,88 a lack of clarity at the time an investment was 
approved of the actual human rights impacts that would arise, or the 
evolution of relevant norms by which the government seeks to abide,89 
to name a few. More importantly, the particulars of how a government 
arrived at such a crossroads do not absolve it of its obligations to protect 
human rights.90 Nor does its track record of compliance with human 
rights to date.91 
In spite of the complicated interactions between legal obligations, 
international courts and tribunals have not yet provided much assistance 
in resolving potential conflicts between obligations arising from human 
rights law and investment treaties. Rather, they have skewed toward 
avoidance of any finding that a conflict exists or toward resolution of a 
 
88. See generally Philippe Le Billon, Contract Renegotiation and Asset Recovery in Post-
Conflict Settings, in HIGH-VALUE NATURAL RESOURCES AND POST-CONFLICT PEACEBUILDING 
69 (P. Lujala & S.A. Rustad eds., 2012). 
89. The international community, for example, has increasingly focused on legitimate tenure 
rights, which may not be recognized under domestic law, but which ought to be protected by 
governments. See generally VOLUNTARY GUIDELINES ON THE RESPONSIBLE GOVERNANCE OF 
TENURE OF LAND, FISHERIES AND FORESTS IN THE CONTEXT OF NATIONAL FOOD SECURITY, 
COMM. ON WORLD FOOD SEC. (2012). Some states have begun to undertake serious efforts to 
implement these voluntary guidelines, which arguably have the status of soft law. Such efforts 
include reforming laws and policies to recognize tenure claims to land that was previously 
classified as public or state land—the type of land most likely to be conceded to investors. 
90. See, e.g., U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, General 
Comment No. 24: State Obligations Under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights in the Context of Business Activities, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/24, ¶ 13 (Aug. 10, 
2017) (“States Parties cannot derogate from the obligations under the Covenant in trade and 
investment treaties that they may conclude.”). 
91. A separate question, not addressed in this Article, is whether the protections flowing from 
an investment treaty are influenced by the investor’s compliance with its human rights 
responsibilities. For example, can an investor have legitimate expectations that the government 
would act contrary to its obligations under human rights law? For one argument that a state’s 
human rights legal obligations are relevant for the determination of whether an investor’s 
expectations are legitimate, see generally Bear Creek Mining Corp. v. Republic of Peru, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/14/21, Submission as an “Other Person” Pursuant to Article 836 and Annex 836.1 
of the Peru–Canada FTA (June 9, 2016). 
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dispute based only on one set of legal obligations. This often means that 
the outcome of a dispute where such tensions are at play depends on the 
body deciding it. Although making pragmatic sense for the tribunal in 
question, this approach leaves governments in limbo—caught between 
conflicting obligations with no clear sense of how to square them. 
In the human rights arena, one prominent exception whereby a 
human rights body did seek to resolve potentially conflicting obligations 
arising from investment law and human rights law is found in the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights’ decision in Sawhoyamaxa 
Indigenous Community v. Paraguay.92 That case concerned Paraguay’s 
failure to resolve a legal claim lodged by the Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous 
Community of the Enxet-Lengua people over the community’s ancestral 
lands. The government had sold the land to foreign investors, who used 
it to set up cattle ranches.93 While the community initially remained on 
the land, members eventually moved, establishing temporary residence 
by the side of a nearby road.94 In 1991, they filed a petition against the 
Paraguayan government seeking recognition of the land as the 
community’s ancestral land. 
Paraguay argued, among other points, that the land had been bought 
by a German national, who refused to sell the land so it could be 
transferred to the community, and who was protected by a bilateral 
agreement between Paraguay and Germany that ensured “the promotion 
and reciprocal protection of capital investments from both countries.”95 
The Court rejected that argument on procedural grounds, noting that the 
treaty had not been provided to the Court for the purposes of the case.96 
The Court proceeded, however, to provide two alternative justifications 
for upholding the community’s rights to the land even in the context of 
an applicable investment treaty. 
Under the Court’s first alternative rationale, the investment treaty 
allowed expropriation of capital investments where necessary for a 
public purpose, and such a purpose could include the restitution of 
ancestral land to an indigenous community.97 Through this line of 
argument, which did not include any detailed explanation of existing 
jurisprudence regarding “public purpose,” the Court sought to 
 
92. Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Cmty., Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 146. 
93. Id. at 16, 30. 
94. Id. at 10. 
95. Id. at 70. 
96. Id. at 77. 
97. Id. (“[S]aid convention allows for capital investments made by a contracting party to be 
condemned or nationalized for a ‘public purpose or interest,’ which could justif[y] land restitution 
to indigenous people.”). 
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harmonize the commercial treaty with the American Convention on 
Human Rights.98 This approach was also similar to the Court’s previous 
ruling in Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay that “restriction 
of the right of private individuals to private property might be necessary 
to attain the collective objective of preserving cultural identities in a 
democratic and pluralist society.”99 Yet while the Court noted in Yakye 
Axa that such a restriction could be proportional if fair compensation 
was paid, it did not reiterate this in Sawhoyamaxa, leaving open the 
question of whether fair compensation would be required when 
expropriation is carried out to restore ancestral land ownership. 
The Court’s second alternative rationale in Sawhoyamaxa for denying 
the state’s investment treaty-based defense focused on the nature of the 
investment treaty and of the American Convention. It concluded that the 
enforcement of “bilateral commercial treaties . . . should always be 
compatible with the American Convention, which is a multilateral treaty 
on human rights that stands in a class of its own and that generates 
rights for individual human beings and does not depend entirely on 
reciprocity among States.”100 This reasoning implies that any 
investment protection provision conflicting with rights protected by the 
American Convention, or any other convention containing protections 
of human rights with which the Court is seized, would need to be 
interpreted in a way that avoids such a conflict.101 
Such reasoning, grounded in an assertion of the primacy of human 
 
98. Pedro Nikken, Balancing of Human Rights and Investment Law in the Inter-American 
System of Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND 
ARBITRATION 246, 260 (P.M. Dupuy, F. Francioni & E.U. Petersmann eds., 2009). 
99. Yakye Axa Indigenous Cmty. v. Para, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 125, ¶ 148 (June 17, 2005). 
100. Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Cmty., Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 146, at 77. 
101. Following the 2006 judgment of the Inter-American Court, the Paraguayan government 
was slow to implement the ruling. In 2008, the Court noted that few of its orders had been 
complied with. In 2009, Paraguay’s Senate rejected a plan to expropriate the land. By January 
2013, negotiations between the government and the community had commenced. In June 2013, 
the Sawhoyamaxa unilaterally reoccupied part of the ancestral lands, and various civil society 
organizations launched campaigns to create political pressure for a formal expropriation of the 
land in question so it could be formally transferred to the Sawhoyamaxa. A law to expropriate the 
land was approved by Congress and signed by the president in 2014. The ranchers then 
challenged the decision to expropriate, but had their case rejected by the Supreme Court of 
Paraguay in October 2014. Case of the Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, 
ESCR-NET, https://www.escr-net.org/caselaw/2013/case-sawhoyamaxa-indigenous-community-
v-paraguay (last visited Nov. 28, 2017); Paraguay: Senate Approves Expropriation Bill in Favour 
of Sawhoyamaxa Community, IWGIA (May 5, 2014), https://www.iwgia.org/en/paraguay/2025-
paraguay-senate-approves-expropriation-bill-in-fav; David Hill, Paraguay’s Supreme Court 
Issues ‘Historic’ Land Ruling, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 7, 2014, 8:13 AM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/andes-to-the-amazon/2014/oct/07/paraguay-supreme-
court-historic-land-ruling. 
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rights obligations, is perhaps unlikely to be widely adopted by 
investment arbitration tribunals, as discussed below. Placing 
international treaties in some form of hierarchy is not without its 
critics,102 and past investment arbitration tribunals have rejected such an 
approach.103 Nonetheless, the Sawhoyamaxa judgment signals that the 
Inter-American Court, and potentially other human rights courts and 
treaty bodies, may reject any defense supplied by a state that its 
obligations under investment treaties (and, potentially, investor-state 
contracts) prevent compliance with its human rights obligations. Even 
when such obligations conflict, a human rights tribunal is likely to find 
that the government’s obligations under human rights law remain and 
must be met.104 
The primacy of human rights obligations has also been underscored 
recently in the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
 
102. As one scholar wrote: 
This reasoning, reflecting the idea that international human rights law is inherently 
superior to other branches of international law, is rather weak. It is difficult to deny 
that treaty commitments entered into by states have under international law the same 
formal status and rank regardless of their subject matter. Moreover, even considering 
that this argument may point to a possible development of international law, it is very 
unlikely that any international tribunal other than a human rights court will be willing 
to follow this line of reasoning. 
Cesare Pitea, Right to Property, Investments and Environmental Protection: The Perspectives of 
the European and Inter-American Courts of Human Rights, in FOREIGN INVESTMENT, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND COMMON CONCERNS, 265, 269 (Treves et al. eds., 2014) 
This notion has been additionally discussed: 
[H]uman rights are pervasive and perennially relevant in all adjudication, but not 
necessarily superior. In this sense, the multiple legal sources available engage in a 
dialogue, rather than opposition, and all cooperate towards achieving the best possible 
result. Human rights are an essential consideration, but not one which automatically 
trumps all other applicable rules. 
Lucas Lixinski, Treaty Interpretation by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights: 
Expansionism at the Service of the Unity of International Law, 21 EUR. J. INT’L L. 585, 591 
(2010). 
103. Suez v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Decision on Liability, ¶ 
262 (July 30, 2010) (“The Tribunal does not find a basis for such a conclusion either in the BITs 
or international law. Argentina is subject to both international obligations . . . and must respect 
both of them equally.”). 
104. Indeed, there exists a draft legally binding instrument, which is currently being 
elaborated by an open-ended intergovernmental working group under a mandate provided by the 
U.N. Human Rights Council. See Elements for the Draft Legally Binding Instrument on 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Respect to Human Rights, 
H.R.C. Res. A/HRC/RES/26/9, ¶ 1.4 (Sept. 29, 2017), 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/WGTransCorp/Session3/LegallyBindin
gInstrumentTNCs_OBEs.pdf (listing as one of the objectives, “[t]o reaffirm the primacy of 
human rights law over trade and investments agreements and establish specific State obligations 
in this regard”). 
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Rights’ General Comment No. 24.105 The General Comment, which 
constitutes an authoritative interpretation of governments’ binding 
obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, asserts that “States parties cannot derogate from the 
obligations under the Covenant in trade and investment treaties that they 
may conclude.”106 This has implications for the interpretation of 
existing investment treaties as well as for the design of future ones, and 
the General Comment notes that States Parties “are encouraged . . . to 
ensure that mechanisms for the settlement of investor-State disputes 
take human rights into account in the interpretation of investment 
treaties or of investment chapters in trade agreements.”107 
Ensuring that investor-state disputes adequately consider human 
rights would require a shift from how most proceedings have been 
undertaken to date. Detailed inquiries into potentially conflicting legal 
obligations are also rare in investment arbitration. In multiple 
investment arbitrations, the host state or amicus curiae have made 
submissions asking that the state’s human rights obligations toward its 
citizens be considered when assessing the scope of the state’s 
obligations and potential liabilities to foreign investors.108 Yet tribunals 
have often dismissed such arguments without in-depth analysis.109 
 
105. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, General Comment 
No. 24: State Obligations Under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights in the Context of Business Activities, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/24 (Aug. 10, 2017). 
106. Id. at ¶ 13. 
107. Id. 
108. See, e.g., cases cited infra note 109 (discussing arbitration cases that implicate human 
rights arguments to varying degrees). 
109. At the time of writing, the most significant treatment of the issue of human rights in 
publicly available arbitral decisions occurred in Urbaser v. Argentina. That dispute is one of 
several that arose out of private investment in water services in Argentina. In that case, the 
tribunal largely addressed human rights arguments in the context of evaluating Argentina’s 
counterclaim against the investor (as opposed to, as has been more common, addressing the issue 
of human rights in the context of the investor’s alleged human rights or in the context of the 
respondent state’s defense). The tribunal ultimately concluded that Argentina’s human rights 
counterclaim failed. The tribunal, however, also included some discussion of the ways in which 
states should reconcile their obligations under human rights and investment law. It stated: 
Argentina had two kinds of obligations. These are its obligations regarding the 
population’s right to water, and its obligations towards international investors. The 
Argentine Republic can and should fulfil both kinds of obligations simultaneously. In 
so doing, the obligations resulting from the human right to water do not operate as an 
obstacle to the fulfilment of its obligations towards the Claimants. Nonetheless, 
Claimants’ argument is too short. It does not resolve the conflict between the 
obligation to guarantee the Concessionaire’s right under the Concession and the access 
of the poor and vulnerable population to water when this cannot be ensured otherwise 
than by failing to comply with the host State’s obligations toward the Concessionaire. 
 
There is no need to open at this juncture the debate on whether foreign investors have, 
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A perfunctory approach by investment arbitration tribunals raises the 
risk that, in certain cases, arbitral decisions may limit the host 
government’s ability to fully comply with its human rights 
obligations.110 For instance, a large award ordered as compensation by 
 
under international law, an obligation to contribute on their part to the provision of 
drinking water to the extent this is required by the human right to water. It is entirely 
sufficient to note that AGBA and its Concessionaire must have been aware that they 
were indirectly bound by the fundamental right to water of the population of Region B 
due to the provision ordering ORAB to take account in its decisions of the “protection 
of the community’s interests” (Sec. 13-II of Law No. 11820), including the “protection 
of the users’ interests,” which are a concern based on Section 4.3 of the Concession 
Contract and in light of Article 42 of the Constitution. 
Urbaser S.A. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/26, Award, ¶¶ 720–21 (Dec. 
8, 2016). Many of the other cases raising human rights arguments have also centered around 
claims against Argentina arising out of the impact on private concessionaires of its response to its 
economic crisis. In defending those cases, one argument raised by Argentina and amicus curiae 
was that the government’s measures were necessary in order to fulfill its obligations to guarantee 
enjoyment of basic human rights threatened by potentially considerable increases in the costs of 
essential public services. In these and other cases, tribunals have tended to avoid engaging with 
human rights arguments. See, e.g., Compania de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. v. Argentine 
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, Decision on the Argentine Republic’s Request for 
Annulment of the Award, ¶ 243 (Aug. 10, 2010) (noting that only the second decision on 
annulment mentioned these issues, but did not discuss them); United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc. v. 
Gov’t of Can., ICSID Case No. UNCT/02/1, Amicus Curiae Submissions by the Canadian Union 
of Postal Workers and the Council of Canadians, ¶¶ 26–37 (Oct. 20, 2005) (regarding human 
rights issues raised by amicus curiae); Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. United States, Amicus Curiae 
Submissions of Friends of the Earth Canada and Friends of the Earth United States, ¶¶ 40–42 
(NAFTA Chapter 11 Arb. Sept. 30, 2005) (regarding human rights issues raised by amicus 
curiae); Methanex Corp. v. United States, Submission of Non-Disputing Parties Bluewater 
Network, Communities for a Better Environment and Center for International Environmental 
Law, ¶¶ 16–18 (NAFTA Chapter 11 Arb. Mar. 9, 2004) (regarding human rights issues raised by 
amicus curiae); Biwater Gauff (Tanz.) Ltd. v. United Republic of Tanz., ICSID Case No. 
ARB/05/22, Petition for Amicus Curiae Status, ¶¶ 3–5 (Nov. 27, 2006) (regarding human rights 
issues raised by amicus curiae). Some tribunals determined that human rights were not at risk, 
e.g., Sempra Energy Int’l v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Award, ¶¶ 331–32 
(Sept. 28, 2007), while others concluded that the government’s human rights obligations did not 
excuse its obligations to comply with investment treaty commitments. See e.g., EDF Int’l S.A v. 
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/23, Award, ¶¶ 366–69, 913–14 (June 11, 2012). 
110. M. SORNARAJAH, RESISTANCE AND CHANGE IN THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT 320 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2015) (noting that the treatment of human rights issues 
and arguments under international investment law to date has been critiqued for the system’s 
potential to “affect the human rights of its people”). See also Tamar Meshel, Human Rights in 
Investor-State Arbitration: The Human Right to Water and Beyond, 6 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 
277 (2015) (“Failure of investment arbitration tribunals to give due consideration to such 
arguments ‘may have a chilling effect on host capital state regulatory initiatives that are needed to 
address non-investment policy objectives. . . .’”) (quoting Suzanne A. Spears, Making Way for the 
Public Interest in International Investment Agreements, in EVOLUTION IN INVESTMENT TREATY 
LAW AND ARBITRATION 271, 272 (Chester Brown & Kate Miles ed., 2011)); Brunno Simma & 
Theodore Kill, Harmonizing Investment Protection and International Human Rights: First Steps 
Towards a Methodology, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: 
ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF CHRISTOPH SCHREUER 678, 679 (Christina Binder et al. eds., 2009) (“The 
tendency towards considering international investment law in a vacuum is perhaps most 
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an investment arbitration tribunal that has failed to consider human 
rights obligations as a defense, mitigating factor, or component of 
applicable law could reduce the domestic revenue that a government 
needs to respect, protect, or progressively fulfill certain human rights. 
Additionally, when good faith efforts to better protect the human rights 
of project-affected communities give rise to colorable claims under 
investment law, states fearing reputational impacts and wanting to avoid 
the costs of litigation and potential liability might be discouraged from 
taking otherwise available steps to advance human rights.111 This risk is 
particularly problematic in light of the exclusionary nature of arbitral 
proceedings, in which project-affected communities and rights-holders 
have either no or very limited ability to provide input into 
proceedings,112 in addition to the fact that arbitral claims have been 
lodged—and won—around governments’ actions and inactions in the 
context of community-led protests.113 
The interactions between intersecting legal frameworks and 
agreements discussed in this Section point to systemic imbalances and 
governance gaps that governments and other stakeholders must 
navigate. The application of investment law to date, moreover, creates 
room for a government’s contractual obligations to be elevated to a 
supranational level, where neither domestic public policy considerations 
nor norms derived from other aspects of international public law, in 
particular human rights law, are applied. This scenario has tangible 
implications for a government’s options to address land grievances. 
 
disturbing with regard to human rights law.”). 
111. For discussions of such “chilling effects” of investment treaties, see generally Kyla 
Tienhaara, Regulatory Chill and the Threat of Arbitration: A View from Political Science, in 
EVOLUTION IN INVESTMENT TREATY LAW AND ARBITRATION 606 (Chester Brown & Kate Miles 
eds., 2011). 
112. See, e.g., Von Pezold v. Republic of Zim., ICSID Case Nos. ARB/10/15 & ARB/10/25, 
Procedural Order 2, ¶ 64 (June 26, 2012) (rejecting the amicus curiae application of indigenous 
communities who claimed rights regarding the land at issue in the ICSID investor-state dispute). 
113. See, e.g., Copper Mesa Mining Corp. v. The Republic of Ecuador, PCA Case No. 2012–
2, Award (Mar. 15, 2016). In this case, a mining concession—and the mining company’s conduct 
with respect to local communities—generated significant social tensions and violence. The 
government of Ecuador ultimately cancelled the concession, prior to the company’s conducting 
all necessary consultations and securing requisite environmental approvals. In response, the 
company brought an investor-state arbitration claim. The tribunal concluded that the government 
had failed to do enough to affirmatively protect the company against anti-mining protests and 
activities. The tribunal stated, “[p]lainly, the government in Quito could hardly have declared war 
on its own people. Yet, in the Tribunal’s view, it could not do nothing.” Copper Mesa Mining 
Corp., PCA Case No. 2012–2 at ¶ 6.83. 
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III.  ADDRESSING LAND GRIEVANCES IN THE CONTEXT OF LEGAL 
OBLIGATIONS 
While potentially conflicting legal obligations pose challenges for 
governments seeking to address land grievances, options do exist. In an 
ideal world, governments would seek rights-compliant options that also 
minimize potential legal liability under investment law or contracts. 
This may prove difficult to attain in every situation: Sometimes, the best 
option may leave the government exposed to potential liability under 
investment law, or may not fully assuage communities’ concerns. Yet 
while an informed understanding of legal obligations (and potential 
risks of legal liability) can help guide decisionmaking, host 
governments also should not be dissuaded from taking actions in the 
public interest, including those to address land grievances. 
This Section describes three options that governments may have at 
their disposal to address land grievances, and highlights how such 
actions might square with their relevant legal obligations discussed 
above. These options focus on adjustments to applicable legal rules: 
renegotiation of contracts, termination of contracts, and modification of 
the domestic legal framework relevant to the investment. In many cases, 
any of those options may represent just one of multiple steps that a 
government might take as it seeks to right the wrongs of land-based 
investments. 
For example, a government may determine that restituting property to 
displaced individuals or communities is necessary. Displacement from 
land—particularly when it has occurred through forced evictions or 
involuntary displacement—is a common trigger of grievances arising 
from land investments.114 In such scenarios, restitution of land or 
property115 to previous land users may be one of the most effective 
remedies that a government can deploy. Of course, restitution is not 
always possible.116 Yet in some cases, restitution of land or property 
may be necessary for the government to comply with its human rights 
 
114.  See discussion supra Section I.B (discussing common causes of land grievances). 
115. Restitution refers to “re-establish[ing] the situation which existed before the wrongful act 
was committed. . . .” G.A. Res. 56/83, art. 35 (Dec. 12, 2001). This discussion focuses on 
restitution as the return of land or property from which land users were displaced. 
116. Basic Principles & Guidelines on Development-Based Evictions & Displacement, Annex 
1 of the Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing as a Component of the Right to an 
Adequate Standard of Living, at ¶ 64, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4/18 (Feb. 5, 2007) [hereinafter U.N. 
Evictions & Displacement Guidelines]. For example, restitution may be materially impossible 
when land or property has been altered or damaged to the point that its return would not 
reestablish, for land users, their situation prior to displacement. See also James Crawford, STATE 
RESPONSIBILITY: THE GENERAL PART 513, 513 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2011) (discussing 
additional situations where restitution may be materially impossible). 
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obligations. For example, restitution of ancestral lands was ordered by 
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in the Sawhoyamaxa case 
discussed above as a critical step toward Paraguay’s compliance with its 
legal obligations.117 
Restitution of land previously allocated to an investor via an investor-
state contract, however, may require renegotiation or termination of the 
contract. In such a situation, renegotiating or terminating the contract 
may be a critical initial step that the government must take in order to 
both address the concerns of its citizens and comply with its human 
rights obligations. Yet such actions can also expose a State to the risks 
of an ISDS claim, as discussed below. 
While the three options discussed in this Section are by no means an 
exhaustive list,118 they help illustrate the accompanying legal and 
political factors that governments must navigate, and the challenges of 
doing so. All three options also implicate investors’ contract rights and 
expectations, a topic that we will come back to in greater detail in Part 
IV of this Article. 
A.  Renegotiating with the Investor 
When land grievances are tied to the legal terms of the investor-state 
contract or the scope of the investor’s rights and obligations under that 
contract, a government might decide that renegotiation of the investor-
state contract would be an appropriate response. For long-term projects, 
requests from either side to renegotiate a contract are not uncommon;119 
as Jeswald Salacuse has noted, “renegotiation of a previous deal seems 
to be as basic to modern business life as is negotiating a new deal for 
 
117. Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Cmty. v. Para., Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, 
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 146, at ¶ 248(6) (Mar. 29, 2006) (“The State shall adopt all 
legislative, administrative and other measures necessary to formally and physically convey to the 
members of the Sawhoyamaxa Community their traditional lands, within three years, as set forth 
in paragraphs 210 to 215 herein.”). Indeed, governments’ obligations under human rights law 
require them to prioritize restitution for “all persons, groups and communities subjected to forced 
evictions.” U.N. Evictions & Displacement Guidelines, supra note 116, at ¶ 64. Restitution is also 
particularly important when indigenous peoples’ land has been taken without their FPIC. The UN 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples emphasizes that dispossessed indigenous peoples 
should be granted “the option of return,” and that restitution should be provided for indigenous 
“cultural, intellectual, religious and spiritual property taken without their free, prior and informed 
consent or in violation of their laws, traditions and customs.” G.A. Res. 61/295, arts. 10–11 (Sept. 
13, 2007). 
118. These three options are part of a larger set of specific and general actions that the authors 
have identified and articulated in Cordes, Johnson, and Szoke-Burke, infra note *. 
119. See, e.g., Act Ratifying the Amended & Restated Concession Agreement Between The 
Republic of Liber. & Firestone Liber., at 2 (Feb. 22, 2008), 
http://www.openlandcontracts.org/contract/ocds-591adf-0966186576/view#/pdf (noting prior 
concession agreements entered into in 1926, 1976 (amended in 1987), and 2005). 
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the first time.”120 Government requests for renegotiation in order to 
address land grievances are therefore possible, and might help to ensure 
that the contract survives over time. 
However, the path to renegotiations may not always be 
straightforward, particularly when renegotiations are not expressly 
authorized in the contract.121 A range of factors may influence an 
investor’s willingness to give up rights previously secured or to take on 
new obligations. For example, an investor with other interests in the 
country, or one that is more interested in the products it would receive 
through the investment than in monetary compensation, may be more 
willing to renegotiate than, say, an investor with little else to tie it to the 
host country, with strong home state support, and/or with access to 
investor-state arbitration under an investment treaty.122 Renegotiation 
also opens up risks for the party seeking renegotiation: The other party 
generally has the right to refuse renegotiation,123 resulting in greater 
leverage if it does agree to return to the negotiating table. A government 
seeking to renegotiate an investor-state contract may have to concede 
hard-won points that had been formalized in the original contract in 
order to secure agreed changes from the investor. 
Investment treaties, and how they have been interpreted, further 
complicate the calculus for governments. Past arbitral decisions have 
scrutinized governments’ efforts to renegotiate, and have found that a 
government’s renegotiation request, coupled with political pressure or 
the threat of sovereign action, can violate its obligations under an 
investment treaty.124 Such findings do not prevent governments from 
seeking to renegotiate using the weight that a normal contracting party 
would use. Yet they create uncertainty for governments as to where the 
line exists over which it is risky to step in their quest to seek 
renegotiation. To the extent that contract renegotiation may be the most 
appropriate response to land grievances, or the most effective way to 
 
120. Jeswald Salacuse, Renegotiating International Project Agreements, 24 FORDHAM INT’L 
L.J. 1319, 1320 (2001). 
121. See id. at 1335–42 (discussing context and causes of extra-deal renegotiations). 
122. Kaitlin Y. Cordes, Lise Johnson & Sam Szoke-Burke, Land Deal Dilemmas: Grievances, 
Human Rights, and Investor Protections, COLUM. CTR. ON SUSTAINABLE INV. 30–31 (2016). 
123. Salacuse, supra note 120, at 1335–36. 
124. See, e.g., Suez v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Decision on 
Liability, ¶¶ 239–243 (July 30, 2010) (citing various sovereign and political acts that, according 
to the tribunal, rendered the renegotiation impermissibly “forceful”); BG Grp. Plc. v. The 
Republic of Argentina, Final Award, ¶ 309 (UNCITRAL Arb. Dec. 24, 2007) (stating that 
sovereign acts aiming to “promote a new deal” with licensees violated FET requirement); 
Compañiá de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, 
Award, ¶¶ 7.4.18–.46 (Aug. 20, 2007) (identifying a range of “political” actions and events as 
improper means of undercutting the concession and forcing a renegotiation). 
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comply with human rights legal obligations, the risks of liability under 
an investment treaty may therefore unduly restrict governments’ efforts. 
B.  Terminating an Investor-State Contract 
In some scenarios, renegotiation of the investor-state contract may 
not suffice to address land grievances, and termination of the contract 
may be needed. For example, a government party to an investor-state 
contract may desire to exit a controversial arrangement tainted by fraud 
or corruption. Or, the grievances precipitated by project operations may 
be so severe that the government and investor may be unable to find any 
mutually acceptable approach that would support both project 
continuation and the satisfactory redress of grievances. 
Often, the terms of the contract and/or domestic law will specify the 
grounds on which one or both parties may or must terminate the 
contract, as well as any related remedies.125 This may include, for 
example, the right to terminate an agreement when the other contracting 
party has failed to fulfill certain obligations. Even if the contract does 
not explicitly contemplate termination in certain scenarios, a 
government party to an investor-state contract may determine that 
termination of the contract is necessary to address the grievances of its 
citizens and/or to comply with its legal obligations under human rights 
law. 
In seeking to terminate, a government can face both political and 
legal risks. If the investor is a foreign investor, for example, the 
investor’s home government may use diplomatic channels to question or 
seek reversal of the decision to terminate. If there is an international 
investment treaty in place that covers the investor, the investor may also 
seek to bring an investor-state arbitration claim to challenge the 
termination.126 
Arbitral tribunals have typically determined that a government’s 
breach of an investor-state contract does not constitute a breach of 
 
125. See, e.g., Carin Smaller et al., The IISD Guide to Negotiating Investment Contracts for 
Farmland and Water, INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. 52 (2014) (discussing contract 
termination provisions); MODEL MINE DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENT: A TEMPLATE FOR 
NEGOTIATION AND DRAFTING 144–49 (2011) (providing examples of different termination 
clauses and discussing the aims of those clauses). 
126. If the investor initiates formal investment arbitration proceedings, the investor’s home 
state may then be prohibited from pursuing diplomatic protection. As explained: 
No Contracting State shall give diplomatic protection, or bring an international claim 
in respect of a dispute which one of its nationals and another Contracting State shall 
have consented to submit or shall have submitted to arbitration under this Convention, 
unless such other Contracting State shall have failed to abide by and comply with the 
award rendered in such dispute. 
See ICSID Convention, supra note 69, art. 27(1). 
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international law if the government was acting as any normal 
contracting party.127 If, however, the government terminated the 
contract through an exercise of sovereign powers (by, for example, 
passing a decree or law, or issuing a judicial decision declaring the 
contract void as against public policy), then that exercise of sovereign 
powers could potentially give rise to an international law violation 
under the FET obligation or obligation to provide adequate 
compensation for an expropriation.128 
However, some arbitral tribunals have also elevated contract rights 
and expectations to a supranational level by finding governments liable 
for contract termination even without the use of sovereign powers.129 
For example, government liability for termination of the contract can 
also arise under the treaty’s umbrella clause.130 The umbrella clause 
allows covered foreign investors to bring claims against host 
governments for contract violations (including unlawful termination) 
even when the government has not exercised any sovereign powers.131 
Moreover, even if a government’s termination of a contract is in 
accordance with the contract itself, tribunals may still deem such an 
action inconsistent with international investment law. In one dispute, for 
example, a tribunal determined that (1) although the contract permitted 
the government to terminate an investor-state contract for certain types 
of contractual violations by the investor, and (2) although the investor 
breached a provision of the contract entitling the government to 
terminate the agreement,132 (3) the government’s decision to terminate 
 
127. See, e.g., Bureau Veritas v. The Republic of Para., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/9, Further 
Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 246–77 (Oct. 9, 2012) (finding the case was a 
“contractual dispute, no more and no less”); Duke Energy Electroquil Partners v. Republic of 
Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/19, Award, ¶¶ 342–66 (Aug. 18, 2008) (finding “no breach of 
the guarantee of fair and equitable treatment”); but see, e.g., Teinver S.A. v. The Argentine 
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/01, Award, ¶ 845 (July 21, 2017) (suggesting that the purpose 
of the contract, not just the nature of the breach, can inject the “sovereign” element necessary to 
support a finding of breach). 
128. See Teinver S.A., ICSID Case No. ARB/09/01, at ¶ 845 (listing cases where a 
government’s breach of an investor-state contract did not constitute a breach of international law). 
129. See, e.g., SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the Phil., ICSID 
Case No. ARB/02/6, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 128 (Jan. 29, 2004) [hereinafter SGS-
Philippines] (concluding that breach of contract is actionable under an umbrella clause even if the 
state was not acting in its sovereign capacity); but see SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. 
v. Islamic Republic of Pak., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/13, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 138–39 
(Aug. 6, 2003) (concluding that sovereign conduct is necessary to establish a treaty breach under 
the umbrella clause). Most tribunals have tended to follow the SGS-Philippines approach. 
130. SGS-Philippines, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6 at ¶128 (violation of contractual umbrella 
clause is a breach). 
131. Id. 
132. In this dispute, the investor had breached a contract provision that required the investor to 
seek and secure the government’s authorization before transferring its contractual rights or 
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the contract was “disproportionate” to the investor’s breach and 
therefore violated the FET obligation.133 
C.  Modifying the Governing Legal Framework 
Another action that a government might take to address land 
grievances is to modify the legal framework governing the investment. 
In some cases, grievances may stem from a gap in the domestic legal 
framework; in others, domestic laws may create or exacerbate 
grievances. In either situation, adjusting relevant laws, regulations, or 
administrative policies may be appropriate or necessary, as a part of the 
ongoing process of governance in which legal rules are adopted, 
amended, elaborated, and at times even repealed. Modification of the 
governing legal framework may be undertaken by entities within the 
legislative or executive branches; it may also occur in the conduct of 
judicial proceedings that interpret the legal framework or craft new 
common law doctrine. 
Apart from adopting changes in law to address ongoing grievances, a 
government might also pursue changes to its legal framework in an 
effort to prevent future grievances, or as a way to better align its 
legislative rules with its human rights obligations or with more recently 
established international instruments and guidelines. For example, 
multiple countries have worked to develop National Action Plans on 
business and human rights as a way to assess the types of legal and 
policy reforms that might be needed to better align with human rights 
obligations and to ensure greater policy coherency.134 Some countries 
have also begun in-depth efforts to implement the Voluntary Guidelines 
on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries, and 
Forests in the Context of National Food Security—efforts that can 
 
obligations to third parties. The contract specified that the contract “shall terminate” in the event 
of “a transfer of rights and obligations of the Participation Contract without prior authorization 
from the Corresponding Ministry.” Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. The Republic of Ecuador, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/06/11, ¶ 120 (Oct. 5, 2012) (quoting the Participation Contract at ¶ 21.1.2). 
The law governing the contract also specified that the Ministry of Energy and Mines could 
terminate the contract if the contractor “[t]ransfer[red] rights or enter[ed] into a private contract or 
agreement for the assignment of one or more of its rights, without the Ministry’s authorization.” 
Id. ¶ 121 (quoting Article 74 of Ecuador’s Hydrocarbons Law). As the tribunal found, the 
investor in fact transferred its rights and obligations under the contract without seeking or 
securing the necessary authorization. Id. at ¶ 381. 
133. Id. at ¶ 681. 
134. For a list of existing national action plans on this topic, see National Action Plans, 
BUSINESS & HUMAN RIGHTS RESOURCE CENTRE, https://business-humanrights.org/en/un-
guiding-principles/implementation-tools-examples/implementation-by-governments/by-type-of-
initiative/national-action-plans (last visited Nov. 28, 2017). 
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include reforming laws and policies around public or state land.135 
Changing the law serves as a key tool for governments seeking to 
effectively address serious concerns of their citizens, including those 
arising from land investments. Changes may specifically target a 
particular contract, aiming to use sovereign power to reshape the 
agreement’s terms. Changes may also arise from more general measures 
that merely impact performance of the contract (e.g., by imposing new 
obligations on the state or investor, deeming certain types of contractual 
provisions invalid). In either case, a government confronts the risk that 
its changes may be challenged by an investor through investment 
arbitration. 
A contract, for example, may set forth certain investor obligations 
regarding the need to secure relevant environmental permits; 
subsequently, however, legislation or regulation may be passed that 
requires human rights and social impact assessments as part of the 
mandatory permitting process, or provides local communities with 
stronger legal rights than they previously had to challenge or even block 
projects.136 Investors may allege that such legislation increases their 
costs, threatens their projects, or violates explicit provisions or the 
implicit structure of the contract. 
Tribunals have tended to agree with the contention that changes to 
the legal framework that are inconsistent with a specific contractual 
provision,137 or with a quasi-contractual commitment,138 will violate an 
 
135.  The FAO has worked with a number of countries to begin implementation of the 
Voluntary Guidelines. See MELINDA DAVIES, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE VOLUNTARY 
GUIDELINES ON RESPONSIBLE GOVERNANCE OF TENURE IN THE LAND LEGISLATION OF SIERRA 
LEONE: ANALYTICAL ASSESSMENT REPORT (2015). For further examples from other country 
contexts, see also Newsletters Archive, FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED 
NATIONS, http://www.fao.org/tenure/newsletters/newsletters-archive/en/ (last visited Nov. 28, 
2017) (documenting efforts to implement the Voluntary Guidelines). 
136. See, e.g., Bear Creek Mining Corp. v. Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/21, 
Witness Statement of César Zegarra, ¶ 28 n.32 (Oct. 6, 2015) (citing Supreme Decree on the 
Adjustments of Mining Petitions and Suspension of Admissions of Mining Petitions, Supreme 
Decree No. 033-2011-EM (June 25, 2011)) (providing that consultation requirements were 
mandatory for mining or oil operations); Total S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/04/01, Decision on Liability, ¶ 117 (Dec. 27, 2010). See also Oxus Gold v. The Republic of 
Uzb., Award, ¶ 827 (UNCITRAL Arb. Trib. Dec. 17, 2015) (finding a breach of FET due to 
legislative changes that contradicted the commitments in a tax stabilization clause). 
137. As the ICSID held in Total S.A. v. Argentine Republic: 
The expectation of the investor is undoubtedly “legitimate”, and hence subject to 
protection under the fair and equitable treatment clause, if the host State has explicitly 
assumed a specific legal obligation for the future, such as by contracts, concessions or 
stabilisation clauses on which the investor is therefore entitled to rely as a matter of 
law. 
ICSID Case No. ARB/04/01, Decision on Liability, ¶ 117 (Dec. 27, 2010). See also Oxus Gold v. 
The Republic of Uzb., Award, ¶ 827 (UNCITRAL Arb. Trib. Dec. 17, 2015) (finding a breach of 
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investment treaty. Tribunals have similarly interpreted contracts as 
containing implied commitments of stabilization, concluding that 
investors are entitled to rely on the general contours of the legal and 
business framework in force at the time the investors made their 
investments or entered into contracts with the host government.139 
Changes to the legal framework—even if not precluded by contract—
may, if too dramatic in the eyes of the tribunal, result in investment 
treaty liability.140 
In sum, legitimate options that governments have for addressing 
human rights concerns arising from land investments include 
terminating the relevant investor-state contract; renegotiating the 
contract; or modifying the general legal framework, including in ways 
that affect performance of the contract or even quasi-contractual 
 
FET due to legislative changes that contradicted the commitments in a tax stabilization clause). 
138. See, e.g., Mamidoil Jetoil Greek Petroleum Prods. Societe S.A. v. Republic of Alb., 
ICSID Case No. ARB/11/24, Award, ¶¶ 649, 651 (Mar. 30, 2015) (reasoning that the tribunal had 
to identify whether the government had provided the investor “assurances and representations” 
regarding the stability of its port regime, since “[t]he fact that Respondent was under no 
contractual obligation to keep the port open for Claimant’s vessels does not answer the question 
whether Respondent had an obligation under the FET standard to provide stability of the port 
regime and use for the period of the lease contract.”); Micula v. Rom., ICSID Case No. 
ARB/05/20, Award, ¶¶ 527–29, 668–69 (Dec. 11, 2013) (noting that an enforceable expectation 
of regulatory stability can be created through a promise, assurance, or representation that is either 
explicit or implicit, to which the government need not have intended to bind itself). See also 
RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 
145 (2d ed. 2012) (stating that “legitimate expectations” regarding the stability of a particular 
legal framework can be based on “any undertakings . . . made explicitly or implicitly by the host 
state”). For some tribunals, commitments of stability can arise merely from the legal framework 
in place at the time the investment is made; for other tribunals, however, something more, such as 
a specific representation directed at the investor, is required. For a discussion of other relevant 
cases, see Lise Johnson & Oleksandr Volkov, Investor-State Contracts, Host-State 
‘Commitments,’ and the Myth of Stability in International Law, 24 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 361 
(2013) (discussing investor-state contracts in the context of both international and domestic law). 
139. Some tribunals have indicated that the guarantee of stability is not a total guarantee 
against change, but a guarantee that change will not be too fundamental or dramatic (as ultimately 
judged by the tribunal): 
[The] obligation to accord fair and equitable treatment necessarily embraces an 
obligation to provide fundamental stability in the essential characteristics of the legal 
regime relied upon by investors in making long-term investments. This does not mean 
that regulatory regimes cannot evolve. Surely they can. . . . However, the . . . obligation 
to accord fair and equitable treatment means that regulatory regimes cannot be 
radically altered as applied to existing investments in ways that deprive investors who 
invested in reliance on those regimes of their investment’s value. 
Eiser Infrastructure Ltd. v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/36, Award, ¶ 382 (May 
4, 2017). See also Murphy Exploration & Prod. Co. v. The Republic of Ecuador, Partial Final 
Award, ¶¶ 281–92 (UNCITRAL Arb. May 6, 2016) (finding Ecuador’s coercive conduct violated 
claimant’s legitimate expectations of fair treatment). 
140. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 138 (discussing cases that have violated an investment 
treaty through inconsistent quasi-contractual commitments).  
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commitments to the investor. Previous outcomes from investor-state 
disputes indicate that, when combined with an investor’s ability to 
access treaty-based investor-state dispute settlement, such courses of 
action may be extremely costly, generating litigation costs, potential 
liabilities, and even reputational harms.141 Tribunals have effectively 
elevated contractual and quasi-contractual commitments to a 
supranational plane on which the commitments are strongly shielded 
from domestic interference. The next Section discusses in more detail 
how tribunals have approached some of these issues, the implications of 
those approaches, and how alternative approaches may produce 
different outcomes that are more responsive to human rights concerns. 
IV.  IMPLICATIONS OF SUPRANATIONAL PROTECTIONS, AND A CALL FOR A 
MORE CRITICAL APPROACH 
Once a foreign investor has secured contract rights in the host state, 
investment treaties—as they have been interpreted by arbitral 
tribunals—provide that investor with strong protections at the 
international level from government conduct that frustrates those 
rights.142 Additionally, even without clear and vested contract rights, an 
investor that has developed “expectations” based on specific 
government commitments or assurances may benefit from similarly 
strong protections against government conduct that frustrates those 
expectations. Fairness and utilitarian considerations can provide 
important reasons to limit a government’s ability to directly or indirectly 
frustrate rights and expectations that the government had previously 
generated.143 At the same time, tribunals’ broad approaches toward 
recognizing and protecting investors’ contract rights and expectations 
may undermine governments’ willingness and ability to protect, respect, 
and fulfill human rights. In recognition of this potential consequence, it 
is imperative that tribunals be more critical of what alleged rights and 
interests they protect. This Section elaborates reasons why tribunals 
 
141. On the issue of reputational costs, see Todd Allee & Clint Peinhardt, Contingent 
Credibility: The Impact of Investment Treaty Violations on Foreign Direct Investment, 65 INT’L 
ORG. 401 (2011) (finding that the mere filing of an investor-state claim is associated with reduced 
foreign direct investment, and a finding of liability is associated with even further declines). 
142. As discussed supra, Section II.A 
143. Fairness and utilitarian considerations similarly are used to justify the doctrine of 
estoppel, protecting those who had acted in reliance on the promises of another. Policy 
considerations relevant to whether the doctrine of estoppel should be applied against private 
parties may not, however, be the same as policy considerations relevant to whether it should be 
applied against the government. For a discussion of these issues in the U.S. context, see Alan I. 
Saltman, The Government’s Liability for Actions of Its Agents That Are Not Specifically 
Authorized: The Continuing Influence of Merrill and Richmond, 32 PUB. CONT. L.J. 775 (2003). 
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should take a more critical approach, as well as techniques for how they 
could do so.144 
The argument advanced here is not that any government entity should 
be free to breach or nullify what another government entity or its 
predecessor has granted. Rather, our argument is that, particularly due 
to the legal force of their awards, tribunals should recognize that not all 
promises granted in contracts or given through quasi-contractual 
conduct are worthy of legal protection—a concept recognized by 
domestic courts across jurisdictions, including in jurisdictions generally 
deemed to have strong protections for economic rights and interests, 
such as the United States. For instance, contracts, or specific provisions 
therein, may be deemed void, voidable, or unenforceable on various 
grounds, including those relating to the capacity or authority of the 
promisor,145 the conduct of the promisee,146 the circumstances under 
which the promise was given147 or recorded,148 the circumstances 
during performance of the contract,149 or the subject matter of the 
promise.150 Domestic courts asked to enforce contracts are often 
requested to apply these contract principles to prevent, or adjust, 
 
144. Another area requiring critical reflection, which we do not engage with in this Article for 
reasons of scope and space constraints, is of course the standards of protections that tribunals are 
interpreting investment treaties to provide, such as those related to the FET and umbrella clause 
obligations. Rather, we focus here on the nature of the rights and interests protected. 
145. Legal or mental capacity can be relevant. See, e.g., Robinson v. Heard, 2001-1697, p. 5 
(La. 2/26/02); 809 So. 2d 943, 946 (addressing the capacity of a sole proprietorship to contract); 
Fed. Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 384 (1947) (stating, in the context of U.S. law, that 
“anyone entering into an arrangement with the Government takes the risk of having accurately 
ascertained that he who purports to act for the Government stays within the bounds of his 
authority”). 
146. A contract may, for instance, be deemed invalid if one party was induced to enter into the 
contract based on the other party’s misrepresentation of a material fact. 14-81 RICHARD R. 
POWELL & PATRICK J. ROHAN, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 81.02 (1968). 
147. Under some conceptions of the doctrine of unconscionability, a contract can be deemed 
unconscionable if it was concluded between parties of grossly unequal bargaining power. See 
Envirotech Corp. v. Halco Eng’g, Inc., 364 S.E.2d 215, 220 (Va. 1988). 
148. “Statute of Frauds” requirements dictate that certain types of contracts be in writing and 
signed by the promisor. The requirement that contracts be in writing often applies specifically for 
contracts relating to the sale of land and other real property. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1624(a) 
(2015) (discussing the types of contracts subject to the Statute of Frauds).  
149. The doctrine of impossibility of performance, for example, can apply when changes in 
circumstances, including changes in the law, render performance impossible or impracticable. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 (AM. LAW INST. 1979). 
150. This can relate, for instance, to contracts for the sale of illegal goods or services. See, 
e.g., David Adam Friedman, Bringing Order to Contracts Against Public Policy, 39 FLA. ST. U. 
L. REV. 563, 574 (2012) (discussing cases where a bargain will be declared unenforceable); M. P. 
Furmston, The Analysis of Illegal Contracts, 16 U. TORONTO L.J. 267, 308 (1966) (noting the 
difficulty in determining whether a contract is illegal). 
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enforcement or performance.151 
In international investment law, however, tribunals appear less likely 
to scrutinize the legitimacy or enforceability of contracts.152 Although 
states have asked tribunals to interpret investor-state contracts in 
accordance with governing law and the limits that governing law places 
on contracting parties’ abilities to strictly enforce contract performance, 
tribunals have in the past been unresponsive to such pleas.153 Indeed, 
even where states have argued that the contract or promise is invalid and 
unenforceable under domestic law, tribunals have declared that they will 
bind the state to the deal anyway—protecting the investors’ interests 
even when doing so may require adherence to an illegal deal that 
frustrates the rule of law in the respective host countries.154 
 
151. Some courts have also seized the opportunity to develop new doctrines regarding the 
conditions and circumstances under which contracts will be enforced. See, e.g., ROBERT W. 
CLARK, INEQUALITY OF BARGAINING POWER: JUDICIAL INTERVENTION IN IMPROVIDENT AND 
UNCONSCIONABLE BARGAINS 3051 (1987); Colleen McCullough, Comment, Unconscionability 
as a Coherent Legal Concept, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 779 (2016) (discussing evolution in the 
doctrine of unconscionability in U.S. federal and state law). 
152. See, e.g., Bankswitch Ghana Ltd. v. The Republic of Ghana, Award, ¶ 11.93 
(UNCITRAL Arb. Apr. 11, 2014) (applying the doctrine of estoppel against the government to 
enforce an otherwise unconstitutional contract); see also cases cited infra note 154 (listing cases 
where tribunals have been unresponsive to pleas asking for interpretations of investor-state 
contracts and mostly protecting investors’ interests). 
153. Illustrating this are cases rejecting the applicability of the theory of imprevisión, which 
can apply in domestic contract law to ease obligations when changed circumstances render 
performance impossible. See, e.g., Murphy Exploration & Prod. Co. v. The Republic of Ecuador, 
Partial Final Award, ¶ 241 (UNCITRAL Arb. May 6, 2016) (noting that the “principle would 
purportedly apply to ‘an unprecedented and extraordinary increase of international oil prices’”); 
Enron Creditors Recovery Corp. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, 
Decision on the Application for Annulment of the Argentine Republic, ¶¶ 214, 284–91 (July 30, 
2010) (recounting Argentina’s objections to, and the tribunal’s reasoning regarding, rejection of 
the theory); BG Grp. Plc. v. The Republic of Argentina, Final Award, ¶¶ 99–100 (UNCITRAL 
Arb. Dec. 24, 2007) (“More specifically, Article 1198 of the Argentine Civil Code [setting forth 
the theory of imprevisión] does not apply in the context of an international investment dispute 
governed by Article 8(4) of the Argentina-U.K. BIT. . . . [T]he domestic law defense of 
unforeseen changed circumstances is of little assistance to Respondent here.”); Sempra Energy 
Int’l v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Award, ¶¶ 243–46 (Sept. 28, 2007) 
(discussing the theory but not clearly applying it as a distinct doctrine under Argentine law). 
154. See, e.g., Awdi v. Rom., ICSID Case No. ARB/10/13, Award, ¶ 289 (Mar. 2, 2015) 
(finding the government to have violated the FET obligation after the Constitutional Court 
deemed that different transfers of contract rights and property were illegal under domestic law); 
Bankswitch Ghana Ltd., ¶ 11.93 (UNCITRAL Arb.); Micula v. Rom., ICSID Case No. 
ARB/05/20, Award, ¶¶ 675–77 (Dec. 11, 2013) (finding that the government’s promised 
incentives established legitimate expectations that legislative changes could not undo); Arif v. 
Republic of Mold., ICSID Case No. ARB/11/23, Award, ¶ 547(f) (Apr. 8, 2013) (finding that the 
country had violated the FET obligation after domestic courts found the relevant investor-state 
contract to be illegal); R.R. Dev. Corp. v. Republic of Guat., Second Decision on Objections to 
Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/23, ¶¶ 146–47 (May 18, 2010) (finding that the 
government was barred from objecting to the decision based on its own law, which it knowingly 
 
2017] Land Grievances and Legal Liability 559 
By not taking seriously constraints imposed on investor-state 
contracts under domestic law, arbitrators allow international investment 
law to sanction and empower illegal conduct. This expands the rights of 
investors beyond what they could have legitimately bargained for. 
The prospect of expansive investor rights raises additional concerns: 
both that arbitrations may stymie development of domestic law, and that 
tribunal decisions regarding the scope and validity of investor rights 
may be based on that stunted legal framework. Domestic law on 
contracts can evolve to respond to new issues, policies, and realities. For 
instance, the meaning of what is an “unconscionable” contract, or 
conceptions of what is unenforceable as against public policy, may not 
only differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but may also change over 
time. Assume the following: An investor-state dispute arises when the 
state seeks to renegotiate a land-concession agreement that it considers 
to be unenforceable as against public policy, an agreement with 
extremely one-sided terms benefitting the investor and with clear 
negative impacts on non-parties. There is, however, no jurisprudence 
yet in the host country, the laws of which govern the contract, that 
clearly addresses unenforceability of contracts due to the specific issues 
prompting the government’s concern. Will the government be able to 
succeed before an investment tribunal on its claims that the contract is 
unenforceable as against public policy? Decisions issued to date 
indicate that the government’s success on those facts is doubtful. In the 
absence of jurisprudence establishing a rule of unenforceability 
applicable to the case, it seems unlikely that arbitral tribunals would 
accept the government’s arguments. 
Even more problematic is the fact that, had the investor-state dispute 
first gone to domestic courts, and had those courts found all or some of 
the contract to be invalid, those judicial decisions could subsequently be 
the basis for a separate investment treaty challenge by the investor.155 
The approaches adopted by tribunals to date are by no means 
inevitable. Tribunals, for instance, could have followed (and could opt 
in the future to follow) an approach whereby investors’ economic 
interests are only protected under investment treaties if they are 
 
overlooked in drafting); Kardassopoulos v. Geor., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/18, Decision on 
Jurisdiction, ¶ 191 (July 6, 2007) (holding that the government cannot avoid representations in the 
agreement by claiming they are void under Georgian law). The Bankswitch decision was a 
commercial case, but reaches its holding due to the tribunal’s decision to incorporate 
“international law” into the terms of the contract. If this were a treaty-based claim, it is the 
authors’ opinion that this particular tribunal would have likely found a breach of the umbrella 
clause and the FET provision as well. 
155. Arif, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/23; Awdi, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/13. 
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recognized as vested rights under the relevant domestic legal system.156 
In practice, this might mean deferring action or refusing protection 
when it is unclear, or when the investor has been unable to establish, 
that the rights alleged are actually valid under domestic law. By only 
protecting valid economic rights recognized under domestic law, 
tribunals would better preserve the domestic sphere as the primary place 
for stakeholders to establish and (re)shape conceptions of economic 
property.157 Such an approach could help bolster legal norms and 
institutions within host countries, thereby supporting stronger rule of 
law within those countries; it might also help to safeguard the voice and 
power of citizens and communities by preserving their ability to contest 
the legitimacy of investors’ claims to own or use the land.158 
If tribunals were to adopt a rule to only protect legal rights that are 
valid and vested under domestic law, such an approach might reduce the 
number of investment arbitration decisions that privilege investor rights 
and expectations over competing—and potentially valid—claims. 
Nevertheless, tribunal decisions on the validity of an instrument (or 
rights granted in that instrument) under domestic law may still be 
especially protective of investor interests and insensitive to competing 
rights and claims. This is due both to the closed nature of investor-state 
arbitration, which limits the opportunities for those with competing 
rights and claims to directly advance their arguments in the 
arbitration,159 and to the reality that the government defending the claim 
 
156. Indeed, that is the approach tribunals have more consistently used when determining 
whether an investment has been expropriated. Nevertheless, under the FET obligation they have 
expanded the scope of their protections to cover economic interests that fall short of rights. 
157. See also Lone Pine Res. Inc. v. Gov’t of Can., ICSID Case No. UNCT/15/2, Submission 
of the United States of America, ¶ 3 nn.3–4 (Aug. 16, 2017) (counseling against protection of 
contingent “interests” and emphasizing the need to look at domestic law to determine the 
existence and scope of a property right). 
158. One reason tribunals have bound governments to contracts or promises that are not legal 
under domestic law is the premise that governments cannot use domestic law as a reason for 
evading their international law responsibilities. This is a fundamental principle of international 
law. Yet this principle applies to questions of whether states have violated their international law 
obligations (by, for example, expropriating property rights) and should therefore be held 
responsible under international law, not to questions of whether and to what extent property rights 
have been created in the first place. See, e.g., MONIQUE SASSON, SUBSTANTIVE LAW IN 
INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION: THE UNSETTLED RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND MUNICIPAL LAW 87 (Wolters Kluwer ed., 2010) (discussing property 
rights in the international investment law context); Venez. Holdings, B.V. v. Bolivarian Republic 
of Venez., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/27, Decision on Annulment, ¶¶ 168–74 (Mar. 9, 2017) 
(discussing whether the investors had acquired property rights). 
159. As of writing, there were no investment treaties or arbitration rules permitting non-parties 
to investor-state arbitrations to intervene in disputes as a matter of right. Non-parties may seek to 
provide input into the dispute as amicus curiae, but tribunals generally have wide discretion under 
applicable treaties and arbitration rules regarding whether to accept such participation. See, e.g., 
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may be hesitant to acknowledge or concede limits on its powers to 
contract. 
A government’s reluctance to concede those limits may be 
understandable—such an acknowledgement might call into question the 
validity of other existing deals, as well as the government’s ongoing 
power to promote investment, raise taxes, or advance its development 
aims. Yet in eschewing any argument admitting the limits of its powers, 
a government denies arbitrators the opportunity to better understand the 
complex disputes that can arise at the domestic level. In particular, this 
risks keeping arbitrators in the dark about disagreements between 
central government officials and local land users regarding their 
respective rights and interests over specific land and decisionmaking 
around it. While local land users may have legitimate objections under 
the domestic legal system (and under international human rights law as 
well), their lack of standing before an arbitral tribunal means that their 
voice and perspectives may not be heard by arbitrators. Rather, the 
central government, which lacks incentives to raise those perspectives, 
is often the only voice representing stakeholders within the respondent 
state that the tribunal will hear.160 
The exclusionary design of investor-state arbitration thus renders it 
difficult to ensure that, even if proof of legality under domestic law 
became a condition for protecting investor rights, the arbitral tribunal’s 
examination of domestic law would take into consideration arguments 
put forth by other constituencies within the respondent state (such as 
local land users) that have a stake in the decision. While such 
constituencies are ostensibly represented by the respondent state, their 
interests are not always aligned with those of the state, as discussed 
above. 
Arbitrators could seek to proactively overcome these participation 
barriers, using tools that they have under many arbitral rules.161 For 
 
U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE L., UNCITRAL RULES ON TRANSPARENCY IN TREATY-BASED 
INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION art. 4 (2014) [hereinafter UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules] 
(governing non-disputing party submissions, and permitting the tribunal to allow such 
submissions in certain contexts, but not providing for intervention as of right). 
160. See, e.g., Von Pezold v. Republic of Zim., ICSID Case No. ARB/10/25, Procedural 
Order No. 2, ¶ 5 (“The Respondent stated that it had no objection to [the amicus applicants] being 
allowed to make submissions provided they . . . do not impinge on or amount to a challenge to the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Zimbabwe.”). 
161. As a general matter, arbitrators have significant discretion to organize the proceedings. 
See, e.g., UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 159, at art. 17(1) (2010) (“Subject to 
these Rules, the arbitral tribunal may conduct the arbitration in such manner as it considers 
appropriate, provided that the parties are treated with equality and that at an appropriate stage of 
the proceedings each party is given a reasonable opportunity of presenting its case.”); id. at art. 
27(3) (“At any time during the arbitral proceedings the arbitral tribunal may require the parties to 
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instance, arbitrators could use their powers to decline to hear cases until 
competing claims over rights were resolved in other fora, such as 
domestic courts or human rights bodies,162 or could dismiss cases 
altogether when an arbitral decision on alleged rights would 
substantially harm the rights of affected non-parties. They could also 
seek and secure input on factual and legal issues from diverse 
constituencies.163 Such steps could increase the information, 
perspectives, and legal arguments available to arbitrators. Yet given 
other barriers to participation of affected stakeholders—such as 
language constraints and limited resources to participate 
meaningfully—these steps would not foreclose the risk that arbitrators 
base their decisions regarding the meaning of domestic law on limited 
inputs provided by a narrow set of stakeholders. 
Of course, even if tribunals were to only enforce contract rights that 
clearly complied with domestic law, inclusively defined and 
determined, there is still a risk that tribunals would enforce concession 
rights that are inconsistent with other sources of international law or 
policy. Such could be the case, for instance, with land investment 
contracts entered into through non-transparent and non-consultative 
processes, and with provisions that do not comply with aspects of the 
Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of 
Land, Fisheries, and Forests in the Context of National Food 
Security,164 or that are inconsistent with the United Nations Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights165 and their attached 
Principles for Responsible Contracts.166 The opportunity for the 
investor to use international investment law and ISDS to ensure the 
government’s adherence to contracts or projects that ignore or thwart 
such guidance undermines broader pushes to improve corporate 
 
produce documents, exhibits or other evidence. . . .”); id. at art. 29(1) (“After consultation with 
the parties, the arbitral tribunal may appoint one or more independent experts to report to it, in 
writing, on specific issues to be determined by the arbitral tribunal.”). 
162. Bureau Veritas v. The Republic of Para., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/9, Further Decision 
on Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶ 284 (Oct. 9, 2012) (finding the case inadmissible, but issuing a 
stay of the proceedings, rather than dismissing them entirely, in order to review the case if the 
claimant’s claims subsequently became admissible). 
163. This course of action may, however, be objectionable to the disputing parties. One 
concern therefore is that arbitrators, who are appointed by disputing parties and presumably 
would like to be appointed in future investor-state disputes, may be reluctant to take action 
opposed by both disputing parties. 
164. WFS GUIDELINES, supra note 8. 
165. Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations 
“Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICE OF THE 
HIGH COMMISSIONER (2011). 
166. U.N. Responsible Contracts, supra note 79. 
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conduct. It also dampens the incentives for investors to proactively align 
their strategies and tactics with best practices and with their 
responsibilities under international human rights law.167 These risks are 
especially present when non-compliance with those international law 
principles helped precipitate the grievances that ultimately led to the 
investor-state dispute.168 
In some cases, tribunals have deemed contracts unenforceable on the 
ground that they violated international public policy.169 They have also 
affirmed that international law is relevant to defining the content of 
 
167. For arguments speaking to ways in which human rights legal obligations and 
responsibilities should influence investors’ claims, see Bear Creek Mining Corp. v. Republic of 
Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/21, Submission as an “Other Person” Pursuant to Article 836 and 
Annex 836.1 of the Peru-Canada FTA (June 9, 2016). 
168. See, e.g., Copper Mesa Mining Corp. v. The Republic of Ecuador, PCA Case No. 2012–
2, Award (Mar. 15, 2016). In this case, local communities that stood to be affected by the 
proposed mining activities underlying the Copper Mesa dispute alleged that they had not been 
adequately consulted regarding the project, and that they instead had been threatened with and 
exposed to violence. These allegations were made both in Ecuador and abroad: to domestic 
officials, including Ecuador’s Ombudsman; in Canadian courts; and to Canada’s National Contact 
Point. See also Courting Justice: Victims of Mining Abuses Sue in Canada, MININGWATCH 
CANADA (last updated Feb. 11, 2012), https://miningwatch.ca/blog/2011/6/6/courting-justice-
victims-mining-abuses-sue-canada (recapping the lawsuit); More Troubles for Ascendant: 
Ecuador’s Ombudsman Intervenes in the Junín Case, MININGWATCH CANADA (July 7, 2006, 
12:39 PM), https://miningwatch.ca/news/2006/7/7/more-troubles-ascendant-ecuadors-
ombudsman-intervenes-jun-n-case (Ombudsman addressing irregularities surrounding the mining 
project); OECD Complaint against Ascendant Copper: Canadian and Ecuadorian Organizations 
Allege Vancouver-based Ascendant Copper Breached International Corporate Responsibility 
Standards in Biodiversity Hotspot, MININGWATCH CANADA (May 18, 2005, 2:09 PM), 
https://miningwatch.ca/news/2005/5/18/oecd-complaint-against-ascendant-copper-canadian-and-
ecuadorian-organizations-allege (discussing complaint under the OECD Guidelines). Community 
concerns regarding adequacy of consultation under domestic and international law contributed to 
opposition against the mining project; the failure to consult was ultimately cited by the 
government as a reason for its decision to terminate the investor’s concession. The investor 
subsequently challenged the government’s decision to terminate the concession, and prevailed in 
investor-state arbitration, securing an award for the majority of the expenses that the investor 
incurred in trying to develop the project. The tribunal concluded that tensions and violent 
conflicts between the mining company and affected communities—tensions and conflicts that, 
according to the tribunal, were made more severe by the investor’s negligent (at best) and 
concessionaire’s knowingly wrongful conduct—meant that “the prospects of the Junín 
concessions being successfully developed by the Claimant were uncertain or even unlikely (albeit 
not impossible).” Copper Mesa Mining Corp., PCA Case No. 2012–2 at ¶¶ 6.90, 6.97–.102. The 
tribunal’s decision therefore cushioned the blow the investor would have likely otherwise felt due 
to its own misdeeds, an example of how arbitration can reduce the risk to investors of engaging in 
substandard practices. 
169. See, e.g., World Duty Free Co. v. The Republic of Kenya, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/7, 
Award, ¶¶ 138–57 (Oct. 4, 2006) (discussing bribery and finding it “contrary to international 
public policy”); Inceysa Vallisoletana S.L. v. Republic of El Sal., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/26, 
Award, ¶¶ 245–52 (Aug. 2, 2006) (finding that fraudulent investment would violate public 
policy). 
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contract rights and obligations.170 Yet tribunals have also read the 
contents of international public policy through a particular lens, one that 
emphasizes the role of certain policy principles—such as “pacta sunt 
servanda” (or “promises shall be kept”), promissory estoppel, or 
proportionality—that may apply to strengthen investors’ alleged rights 
or expectations.171 This same lens more narrowly circumscribes the 
roles of other public policies (such as policies of good governance and 
transparency) that might weaken the investors’ contract or quasi-
contract claims.172 Similarly, tribunals have been reluctant to grapple 
with contentions that other international law frameworks—including 
human rights law—place fundamental limits on the scope and nature of 
investors’ claimed rights.173 
This Article does not advocate in favor of an international law 
 
170. See, e.g., Urbaser S.A. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/26, Award, 
¶¶ 618–25 (Dec. 8, 2016) (“The protection of this universal basic human right constitutes the 
framework within which Claimants should frame their expectations.”). 
171. See, e.g., Copper Mesa Mining Corp. v. The Republic of Ecuador, PCA Case No. 2012–
2, Award (Mar. 15, 2016) ¶¶ 5.54–.60 (holding that the treaty only required legality in the initial 
making of the investment; illegality in the operation of—which included ongoing investment in—
the project could not, according to the arbitrators, preclude the tribunal from taking jurisdiction 
over the investor’s claims); Bankswitch Ghana Ltd. v. The Republic of Ghana, Award, ¶ 11.97 
(UNCITRAL Arb. Apr. 11, 2014) (finding an international public policy of estoppel against the 
government, but placing less weight on adherence to the law and good governance notions of 
transparency); Vannessa Ventures Ltd. v. The Bolivarian Republic of Venez., ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)04/6, Award, ¶ 167 (Jan. 16, 2013) (stating that “the jurisdictional significance of the 
‘legality requirement’ in the definition of an investment in Article I(f) is exhausted once the 
investment has been made”); Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. The Republic of Ecuador, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/06/11, ¶ 120 (Oct. 5, 2012) (applying the principle of proportionality to hold the 
government liable for wrongfully exercising its contract rights). 
172. See cases cited supra note 170 (discussing the multiple ways in which courts have 
applied different policy principles). 
173. See, e.g., Copper Mesa Mining Corp., PCA Case No. 2012–2 at ¶¶ 2.9, 5.64. In Copper 
Mesa, the tribunal stated that one of the principal issues in the case was whether the Claimant 
“owned and controlled” its investments in accordance with Ecuadorian law, including 
international human rights law as incorporated in Ecuadorian law. It nevertheless subsequently 
determined that the fact that Ecuador had not timely objected to the mining company’s failure to 
consult with local communities and failure to respect local citizens’ human rights meant that the 
respondent was subsequently “precluded” from arguing that the company’s claims could not or 
should not be heard by the tribunal. See also Von Pezold v. Republic of Zim., ICSID Case No. 
ARB/10/15, Procedural Order No. 2, ¶ 62 (June 26, 2012) (The tribunal stated that the 
investors/claimants “themselves recognize that [the indigenous communities] have some interest 
in the land over which the Claimants assert full legal title. . . . It may therefore well be that the 
determinations of the Arbitral Tribunals in these proceedings will have an impact on the interests 
of the indigenous communities.” The tribunals ultimately rejected the indigenous communities’ 
amicus application on the basis that the disputing parties themselves had not put human rights at 
issue in the case, and that the indigenous communities’ arguments were adverse to and may 
unduly prejudice the claimants). Suez v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, 
Decision on Liability, ¶ 262 (July 30, 2010) (“The texts of the three BITs in question do not 
specifically exclude or allow the admissibility of a defense of necessity.”). 
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framework that enables governments to terminate or unilaterally modify 
foreign investors’ rights whenever it faces competing claims from 
domestic constituents. Yet we do argue that investor-state tribunals, to 
the extent they continue to play a role in adjudicating investment 
disputes, must be much more critical regarding the nature and scope of 
contract rights (and expectations) that they deem enforceable. This 
aligns with arguments that international investment arbitration is a 
public function, and that this public function should “shape the 
normative understanding of the role of arbitrators in investment treaty 
cases, including their professional and ethical obligations and the way 
they exercise their procedural powers in conducting arbitral 
proceedings.”174 
Even taking a more transactional view of arbitration and arbitrators—
a view in which arbitrators solely resolve disputes between parties on a 
case-by-case basis, and do not effectively create law or have policy 
impacts on non-parties—one can see that the tools, methodologies, and 
rationales they employ to decide the disputes175 are not always 
inevitable. Rather, their selection reflects tribunals’, arbitral 
institutions’, and the arbitration industry’s policy choices and value 
judgments. Indeed, it has been acknowledged that even commercial 
arbitral tribunals’ approaches are informed by policy considerations.176 
 
174. Stephan W. Schill, Crafting the International Economic Order: The Public Function of 
Investment Treaty Arbitration and Its Significance for the Role of the Arbitrator, 23 LEIDEN J. 
INT’L L. 401, 406 (2010). 
175. This includes, for example, arbitrators’ approaches to the applicable burden of proof, 
their views of what evidence should and should not be relied upon to support that burden, their 
interpretations of conflicts of law rules, and their interpretations of the content of governing 
substantive law. Commercial arbitrators have also played a policy role through their decisions to 
“internationalize” a contract, going beyond the domestic law specified as applying to the dispute 
in order to apply select principles of international public policy deemed relevant and controlling 
by the tribunal. See SORNARAJAH, supra note 110, at 23 (discussing global public policy in the 
context of investment protection); Thomas W. Waelde & George Ndi, Stabilizing International 
Investment Commitments: International Law Versus Contract Interpretation, 31 TEX. INT’L L.J. 
215, 230–31 (1996) (discussing as particularly relevant “the imposition of new environmental 
obligations . . . reinterpreting existing law on which the investment decision may to some extent 
have been based”). 
176. See, e.g., Bankswitch Ghana Ltd. v. The Republic of Ghana, Award, ¶ 11.72 
(UNCITRAL Arb. Apr. 11, 2014) (“Apart from public international law, international public 
policy as applied consistently in international arbitration . . . has to be considered by this 
Tribunal.”). Further, Joshua Karton has written: 
[There is] a widespread attitude among international arbitration practitioners and 
commentators that the governing law often does not matter much. International 
arbitration has been described as having a ‘lawless’ aspect, in that tribunals may decide 
based on what they see as the most commercially reasonable outcome rather than on 
strict application of the law. 
Joshua Karton, The Arbitral Role in Contractual Interpretation, 6 J. INT’L DISP. 
SETTLEMENT 4, 4 (2015). 
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To date, tribunals’ views of the impacts their decisions can have, and 
of the sources of law that should inform their decisions, have been 
relatively myopic. While tribunals have concluded that enforcing 
contracts and quasi-contractual promises can encourage increased 
investment (an often-stated objective of investment treaties), they have 
not similarly recognized that the protections offered by tribunals can 
negatively affect competing rights and claims. Nor have tribunals noted 
their potential to marginalize the role of domestic institutions as the core 
fora in which property rights claims are shaped and reshaped over time. 
Tribunals could operationalize a more critical role by employing 
various complementary strategies and tools. As highlighted above, 
tribunals should proactively seek input from non-parties whose rights 
could be adversely affected by a tribunal decision. Tribunals should 
further clarify that the investor has the burden of establishing the 
undisputed validity of its alleged contract rights—the rights the investor 
is claiming to be infringed—under both domestic and international law. 
This would include establishing that the alleged contract rights do not 
run contrary to human rights law.177 Finally, tribunals should dismiss or 
stay cases when the claimants assert rights that, if recognized by the 
tribunal, would adversely affect the rights of non-parties. So long as 
international investment treaties continue to provide a privileged avenue 
for investors to validate their rights and expectations through ISDS, a 
fundamentally different approach to such dispute settlement is needed in 
order to mitigate the risks presented by an investor-centric legal system 
to other stakeholders and interests. This approach must ensure that the 
rights protected in this area of international law are consistent with, and 
do not undermine, broader international norms of law and policy, 
including human rights law. These recommendations can help, but 
represent a major shift from current practices. 
 
177. If domestic law deserves deference by investment arbitral tribunals in determining the 
validity of an investor’s alleged contract rights or expectations, why then do we argue that 
international human rights law must also be considered in such an assessment? Why is 
“intrusion” of one type of international law in the domestic sphere more appropriate than another? 
We take this view primarily because of the deep distinctions between international investment 
law and international human rights law. International human rights law is fundamentally about 
protecting inherent, universal, and inalienable rights that all humans have. See, e.g., What Are 
Human Rights?, UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R (last visited 
Nov. 28, 2017), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Pages/WhatareHumanRights.aspx. Because 
these rights are inherent regardless of a state’s specific domestic legal framework, intrusion of 
international human rights law in the domestic sphere to protect human rights is acceptable. 
International investment law, on the other hand, is not concerned with inherent rights, but serves 
essentially as a tool of economic governance. The intrusion of international investment law in the 
domestic sphere is, at its core, a manipulation of law to protect certain economic interests over 
others; those economic interests are not inherent or inalienable rights. 
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CONCLUSION 
This Article has explored how host governments’ legal obligations—
especially under international investment law and investor-state 
contracts—can affect or constrain their ability to meaningfully address 
grievances arising from land-based investments. These implications are 
also relevant for concerns arising from other types of investments. The 
governmental obligations found in international investment law, 
international human rights law, and investor-state contracts intersect and 
interact in complex ways. Differing enforcement mechanisms also 
complicate the calculus. Resolving these tensions can be difficult for 
governments, which may struggle to find ways of complying with their 
human rights obligations to individuals and communities affected by 
investments without exposing themselves to liability under international 
investment law or their investor-state contracts. The Article nonetheless 
proposed three options related to legal frameworks that governments 
can employ to address land grievances. Knowledge of such options, and 
their associated drawbacks, will become increasingly relevant as more 
governments encounter grievances arising from investments. 
Given the risks that such options raise in the context of international 
investment law, the Article also examined current practices of arbitral 
tribunals adjudicating claims brought by investors under investment 
treaties, and argued that tribunals must be much more critical regarding 
the nature and scope of contract rights (and expectations) that they deem 
enforceable. Key to this is a recognition that the richness of domestic 
legal contractual doctrines can help to ensure that the interpretation and 
enforcement of investors’ claimed rights does not unduly constrain 
governments’ willingness and ability to comply with international 
human rights obligations.  
We do not advocate for the ability of a government entity to always 
and with impunity rescind commitments made by its predecessor or by 
another government entity; rather, we implore arbitrators to more 
seriously interrogate whether and when express or implied promises 
made to investors are worthy of legal protection. While this would be an 
incremental adjustment to the international investment law regime (the 
future of which is not addressed in this Article), it would still require a 
substantial shift from current practices. In the absence of a fuller 
overhaul of the investment law system, this shift would provide a 
critical stopgap measure to help ensure that arbitral decisions under 
investment treaties do not undermine governments’ abilities to uphold 
their human rights obligations or to address the concerns of their 
citizens. 
